bomber force that could carry the war to the
enemy. Deterrence was preferable to war. In the
Far East, the construction of the Singapore naval
base was resumed, even though neglect of the
British fleet meant that there would be few war-
ships to send east if trouble simultaneously
occurred in Europe. Worst affected by the parsi-
mony of defence expenditure was the British
army. In the event of war, only a token force
could be despatched to France. This limited mil-
itary commitment to the defence of the European
continent was adhered to by governments and
critics until 1939. The main burden of contain-
ing Germany on land would rest on the French.
British foreign policy followed its own logic.
Both France and Germany needed to be re-
strained. Britain would mediate between them.
Even though Hitler secretly and openly defied
treaties, Britain would go far to conciliate
Germany and assure it that ‘reasonable’ rearma-
ment would be acceptable to the other powers.
When Eden visited Berlin in February 1934 he
attempted to persuade Hitler to return to the
League, and thought him sincere in wishing to
conclude a disarmament convention. Eden’s
policy was to gain Hitler’s signature to a treaty
which would permit German rearmament but
also, by its very provisions, place a limit on it.
When the British government in July 1934
announced rearmament in the air, the search for
an Anglo-German agreement did not slacken.
Hitler was outwardly cautious during the six
months from the summer of 1934, which opened
with the failure of the Nazis in Austria and ended
in January 1935 with the holding of the plebiscite
in the Saar which would decide that region’s
future.
The Saar was ‘brought home’ to the Reich by
votes through the ballot box and not by force,
under the supervision of the League of Nations.
Dr Goebbels had, however, mounted a propa-
ganda campaign and so helped to ensure a Nazi
‘yes’ vote of 90 per cent. Hitler’s prestige was
further enhanced.
In the spring of 1935 Hitler was simply
waiting for a good opportunity to announce the
reintroduction of conscription and Germany’s
open repudiation of the military restrictions of the
Versailles Treaty. Everyone, of course, already
knew that they had been ‘secretly’ broken for
years. Indeed, a British defence White Paper, pub-
lished in March 1935, which justified modest
British rearmament by referring to Germany’s
‘illegal’ rearmament, provided the kind of pretext
Hitler sought. It was followed by the approval of
the French Chamber on 15 March 1935 to
extend military service from one to two years. On
the very next day Hitler sprang a ‘Saturday sur-
prise’, proclaimed conscription in Germany and
‘revealed’ the existence of the Luftwaffe. Britain’s
reaction was characteristically weak. Sir John
Simon, the foreign secretary, and Anthony Eden,
minister for League affairs, hastened to Berlin to
exchange views with Hitler. The Führer was now
ready to receive them. With conscription in the
bag, Hitler could afford to be affable. Britain’s
conciliatory gesture vitiated the meeting of the
Locarno powers at Stresa a short while later in
April 1935. Hitler’s unilateral breach of Versailles
and Locarno was condemned and the need to
uphold treaties spelt out in the final communiqué.
Significantly Mussolini had lined up with Britain
and France and not with Germany. The League
then joined in the condemnation.
If Hitler was impressed by this united front –
and there is no reason to believe he was much –
any apprehensions he might have felt were soon
dispelled by the British government. Without con-
sulting its French ally, Britain signified that
Germany could also breach the Versailles limita-
tions on its naval development by concluding the
Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June 1935.
This now permitted Germany to develop its for-
midable ‘Pocket’ battleships and submarines; all
Germany undertook was not to construct a fleet
whose total tonnage would exceed 35 per cent of
the combined fleets of the British Common-
wealth. Even so this treaty also held out the
eventual prospect of equality with Britain in sub-
marines. Hitler did not have to push to open
doors, they were flung open for him. Already
Hitler was considering his next step, the remili-
tarisation of the Rhineland in violation of that part
of the Versailles Treaty that France held dear as a
guarantee of its own security.