Africa. On 13 July, the murder of a well-known
anti-Republican politician by members of the
Republican Guard provided a further pretext for
the military rising, which had actually already
been set in motion. A day early, on 17 July, the
army rose in Morocco. General Mola had ordered
the risings to begin in Morocco on 18 July and
the garrisons in mainland Spain to take power a
day later. But the risings on the mainland also
began earlier, on the 18th, and the following day
spread to Spain’s two largest cities, Madrid and
Barcelona. Here the risings were successfully sup-
pressed. Thus the army failed to take over the
whole of Spain in one swift action. Within a
short time the Nationalist and Republican zones
were becoming clear. Their respective military
resources were fairly equally balanced in metro-
politan Spain with about half the army and most
of the air force and much of the fleet siding with
the government of the Republic.
What decisively tipped the balance was the
help Hitler and Mussolini gave to Franco, pro-
viding transport planes to ferry the African army
to the peninsula. Franco decided not to risk cross-
ing by sea. The Republican fleet’s doubtful capac-
ity was thus not tested. The disorganisation on
the Republican side extended to the air force,
which made no efforts to intercept the German
and Italian transport planes. The Nationalists
speedily dominated the west and much of the
south. By the end of July, Burgos in the north
had become the capital of Nationalist Spain.
There, Mola had set up a junta of generals.
However, it was Franco who was accepted by all
the generals as their commander-in-chief; by the
end of September he was also declared head of
the Spanish state as well as of the government.
This marked the beginning of a long, undisputed
hold on absolute power which was to last until
his death thirty-nine years later in 1975.
1
THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND EUROPE, 1936–9 217
Militia coming to the aid of the Republic, 1936. © Robert Capa R/Magnum Photos
