between two men, Hitler and Chamberlain. Hitler
could not safely wage war without the assurance
that rearmament had progressed sufficiently – an
assurance that required the cooperation of indus-
try and the management of finance. Actually the
reserves were very low. Nor could he totally
ignore technical military considerations. He
needed the cooperation of the army. The overlap-
ping party and state machinery of government,
and the gearing of the economy to war prepara-
tions under Hermann Göring’s overall direction,
created many problems. The ‘court’ of leading
Nazis around the Führer – Himmler, Goebbels,
Hess, Bormann, Göring, and lesser sub-leaders
such as Rosenberg, Ribbentrop and Ley – were
engaged in bitter infighting, jockeying for Hitler’s
favour and a more influential place in the hierar-
chy. German policy making was not monolithic;
various highly placed people and organisations
influenced policy. Hitler certainly had the last
word on all major issues, but took care to try to
carry the leaders of the army, industry and the
mass of the people with him. His speeches were a
torrent of untruths, carefully calculated; he was
well aware that war with Britain and France was
widely regarded with apprehension.
The many dimensions of British policy and
influences shaping it are just as complex, though
different. Party political considerations play an
important role in the making of policy in a parlia-
mentary democracy. Governments were more
directly affected by public feeling, which could be
freely expressed, unlike in Germany. Decisions in
Britain were taken by committees, the supreme
government committee being the Cabinet, which
met at the prime minister’s residence. Chamber-
lain’s control was never dictatorial as Hitler’s was.
Chamberlain’s ascendancy over his ministerial col-
leagues was at its height in 1938, but he could not
act without carrying them with him – resignations
had to be contained to the single minister in dis-
agreement. In 1939, Chamberlain’s influence less-
ened as the assumption behind his policies was
seen to be more and more at variance with unfold-
ing events in Europe. Belated rearmament was a
particular handicap, narrowing Britain’s policy
options.
There was one further, striking difference
between German and British policy. Hitler paid
relatively little attention to his two ‘allies’, Italy
and Japan, and fashioned policy without allowing
their reactions to affect his own decisions. Not so
the British government, which, while taking the
lead in the framing of the policy in the West,
could not ignore France’s reactions and later
Poland’s. Britain stood at the centre of the
Commonwealth, and the views of Canada, South
Africa, Australia and New Zealand also made
themselves felt.
The greatest difference between Britain’s and
Germany’s positions derived from Britain’s role
not only as a European but a world power with
imperial interests in every continent. These inter-
ests were each supported by different politicians
and pressure groups which conflicted with each
other when the priorities of policies came to
be resolved. Britain’s commitments to defend
Australia, New Zealand and India from the
Japanese threat were as absolute as considerations
of security at home which required Britain to
stand by France if it were attacked by Germany.
The Defence Requirements Committee, specific-
ally assigned the task of analysing Britain’s mili-
tary needs, came to a clear decision when it
reported to the Cabinet in February 1934 that
Germany was ‘the ultimate potential enemy
against whom all our “long range” defence policy
must be directed’.
For many years none of Britain’s armed forces
would be strong enough to meet all potential
enemies. At first there were only two of these:
Germany in Europe, rapidly arming, and Japan in
Asia. With the outbreak of the Italian–Abyssinian
war and Britain’s support for League sanctions
there was now a third potential enemy with naval
forces in the Mediterranean – Italy. The need to
defend every British possession was equally
absolute. How then was the lack of resources to
be matched to these requirements? That was the
task of diplomacy. The real question was not
whether or not to appease, but which nation to
stand up to and which to conciliate. In the Far
East much would depend on the attitude of the
US. Britain’s situation vis-à-vis the US in Asia was
similar to that of France vis-à-vis Britain in