minister were forced to resign early in 1938.
Hitler assumed personal supreme control with his
own military staff by replacing the War Ministry
with the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW,
or high command of the armed forces). The
general staff of the army was subordinated to the
OKW. The army was purged of generals unen-
thusiastic about Nazi plans. The foreign minister,
Konstantin von Neurath, was also replaced – by
an ardent Nazi, Joachim von Ribbentrop – and
the diplomatic service was purged. Before
embarking on action, Hitler had thus powerfully
strengthened his authority.
Hitler had no immediate plans for the annex-
ation of independent Austria. Yet within a few
weeks it was a fact. The events as they unfolded
made possible a quick finish to Austria’s inde-
pendence and convinced Hitler in the spring of
1938 that the tide was running swiftly and
favourably towards Germany’s destiny. He had
wished to cow Austria into satellite status
without, for the time being, openly destroying its
independence. From 1936 to February 1938 he
succeeded well with the Austrian chancellor,
Schuschnigg, who was finally summoned to his
mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden a month
before the Anschlussto be bullied into agreeing
to make far-reaching further concessions to the
Nazis in Austria entailing the certain erosion of
what independence had remained. Deserted by
Mussolini, he had little choice but to agree to
German demands.
Mussolini preferred a German alignment ever
since his conflict with Britain over Italian aggres-
sions in Abyssinia and involvement in Spain. He
was jealous of German success, but in 1936 bom-
bastically claimed that European affairs now
revolved around the Axis of Berlin and Rome. He
visited Hitler in September 1937 and was
impressed by the spectacle of Germany’s might
and flattered by the Führer’s attentions. He had
already secretly removed his objection to German
dominance over Austria and had been assured
that its independence would not be too blatantly
destroyed.
That is one reason why Hitler as late as 28
February 1938 sought an ‘evolutionary’ Austrian
course. But Schuschnigg in the end would not
play the game; the rabbit bolted. When he
returned to Austria he announced he would hold
a plebiscite on 13 March, intending to ask the
people whether they desired independence or
union with Germany. Despite the suppression of
the socialists and trade unions, who had no love
for Schuschnigg, their vote would have been cast
against Hitler’s Germany. Hitler demanded a
‘postponement’ of the plebiscite. Schuschnigg
conceded and resigned. But now the president
would not appoint the National Socialist nominee
in his place, a new demand. Göring, given respon-
sibility for the Austrian Nazi takeover, had com-
pleted the military preparations. On 12 March
1938 the Wehrmacht crossed the frontier; Hitler
followed close behind. There was no military
opposition. Hitler was received in Linz with
cheers and flowers by part of the population. He
decided on an instantaneous acceleration of his
plans. Instead of a gradual fusion of the two
countries, complete union, or the Anschluss, was
announced on 13 March and later approved by a
charade of a plebiscite.
It all happened so quickly that international
reaction in the first place consisted merely of
some ineffectual protests. But this ruthless expan-
sion of Germany’s frontiers forced the British and
French governments into a fresh stock-taking.
In February 1938 Eden resigned and Halifax
replaced him at the Foreign Office. Eden had
resigned over the immediate difference of opinion
with Prime Minister Chamberlain on whether
Mussolini should be appeased before he had given
concrete proof of abiding by international under-
takings and withdrawing troops from Spain. Eden
was testing the good faith of the dictators, while
Chamberlain was following a grand design of
foreign policy and was ready to subordinate ‘sec-
ondary’ questions to its fulfilment. Chamberlain’s
grand design for peace and stability involved
working separately on Hitler and Mussolini. His
ideas had already been clearly formulated the pre-
vious November 1937 when he sent Halifax, then
lord president of the Council and not foreign
secretary, on a mission to Hitler. Halifax, accord-
ing to the official British record, told Hitler that
Britain accepted:
1
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN EUROPE, 1937–9 227
