Chamberlain was essentially right when he
assessed the US as an unlikely ally at the outset
of any war in Europe. Whatever Roosevelt might
say, he was the prisoner of an overwhelmingly iso-
lationist Congress. Also Chamberlain was right
that no reliance could be placed on the Soviet
Union, which was not ready for war and would
not fight Germany in alliance with Britain and
France as long as she could divert the German
attack from her own territory.
By the spring of 1938 the Anglo-French
alliance had reached a pretty low point. The
British Cabinet was forging ahead with the grand
design of Chamberlain’s peace policy, intermit-
tently consulting French ministers. A consistent
British policy was followed throughout 1938. It
was obvious that the German-speaking inhabi-
tants of Czechoslovakia would be the next target.
Germany was informed that the November 1937
assurances to Hitler still held. Britain was willing
to come to an agreement over the Sudeten ques-
tion on Germany’s terms provided this could be
accomplished peacefully. The new French gov-
ernment of Prime Minister Édouard Daladier and
Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet was promised
the support of the British alliance if Germany
launched an unprovoked attack on France. The
sting in this seemingly satisfactory guarantee was
that it was not extended to the case where France
declared war on Germany in fulfilment of its com-
mitment to the Franco-Czechoslovakian alliance.
In this way the British alliance became a potent
weapon which Chamberlain and Halifax used to
force the French into line behind a policy of con-
cessions to Germany at Czechoslovakia’s expense.
Not that the French had much spirit of resistance
given the pessimism of General Gamelin and the
British attitude. French policy too was to reach
agreement with Germany. The French consis-
tently sought to influence British policy, without
ever taking a position in advance of Britain’s
which risked war. France, the ministers had
decided in March 1938, ‘could only react to
events, she could not take the initiative’.
In dealing with Germany, Britain offered the
carrot and the stick. The colonial, territorial and
economic carrots dangled before the Germans
have already been noted. The ‘stick’ consisted of
refusing to bind Britain to neutrality if Hitler did
resort to force. Chamberlain declared in the
House of Commons after the Anschluss:His Majesty’s Government would not however
pretend that, where peace and war are con-
cerned, legal obligations are alone involved
and that if war broke out it would be likely to
be confined to those who have assumed oblig-
ations. It would be quite impossible to say
where it might end and what Governments
might become involved.It was a clear warning to Hitler not to attack
Czechoslovakia, though secretly the Cabinet had
already concluded that there was no way in which
Czechoslovakia could be helped militarily.Plans for attacking Czechoslovakia were discussed
by Hitler and the generals in April 1938. To
ensure that Czechoslovakia would receive no sup-
port, a crisis was to be worked up. At the end of
May Hitler declared to his generals his ‘unshake-
able will that Czechoslovakia shall be wiped off
the map’. He signed a military directive which set
a final date, 1 October 1938. He had been infuri-
ated by indications that Czechoslovakia would not
tamely submit as Austria had done. Rumours of
German military moves had in May led to a partial
Czech mobilisation and warnings from Britain
and France. He was not yet ready to smash
Czechoslovakia but soon would be.
Among all the Eastern European states, only
Czechoslovakia had retained its Western demo-
cratic constitution – an added reason to make it
unfit for German partnership. Another sin was the
prominent support Czech statesmen gave to the
ideals of the League of Nations. Czechoslovakia,
largely because of its national composition, faced
grave difficulties as a new successor state. In 1930
the country was inhabited by 7.1 million Czechs,
3.3 million Germans, 2.6 million Slovaks, 720,000
Hungarians, 569,000 Ruthenes, 100,000 Poles
and a smaller number of Romanians and
Yugoslavs. The cohesion of the state depended on
the cooperation of Slovaks and Czechs as symbol-
ised by the founding fathers, Thomas Masaryk and
Eduard Benesˇ. The peasantry of Slovakia was