administered mainly by the more educated Czechs,
which caused discontent and the creation of a
Slovak People’s Party, led by Father Hlinka,
demanding autonomy. But the most serious diffi-
culty was caused by relations with the German-
speaking ex-Habsburg population living in
Bohemia and Moravia and along the frontiers with
Germany and the new Austria. Most of the
Germans, once the masters, now resented their
subordination to the ‘Slav’ state. Czech suspicions
of German loyalties and attempts to favour Czech
education and discriminate against Germans
aroused anger and resentment.
The depression of the 1930s and the conse-
quent economic crisis sharpened nationality con-
flicts as both Slovaks and Sudeten Germans
blamed the Czechs. It coincided with the rise of
Hitler, whose movement inspired imitations. In
Bohemia and Moravia Konrad Henlein led the
German National Front, which claimed rights for
the Germans within the state, but secretly in 1938
worked for its disruption and union with
Germany. Meanwhile, Hitler publicly proclaimed
that he would ‘protect’ the Sudeten Germans,
who were unable to protect themselves. But not
all Germans were enamoured of the Nazis. A
significant minority of Social Democrats opted for
Czechoslovakia out of hatred for Hitler. In 1938
the Czechs made far-reaching attempts to satisfy
the German minority in negotiations with
Henlein. But as Henlein had been told at a
meeting with Hitler always to ask for more than
the Czechs would accede to, these negotiations
were doomed. Despite the genuine catalogue of
internal difficulties, the ‘multinational’ army was
patriotic and loyal and Czechoslovakia was in no
danger of internal disruption. It was Hitler’s
aggression and Anglo-French diplomacy that
destroyed Czechoslovakia in two stages, in
September 1938 and in March 1939.
The agony of Czechoslovakia had its counter-
part in Chamberlain’s triumphant reception after
saving the peace in September 1938. For the first
time the Western democracies had been brought
to the brink of war. The German army high
command was alarmed as well by Hitler’s tactics
and warned Hitler that the Wehrmacht was not
ready for war against France and Czechoslovakia.
In August 1938 Colonel Ludwig Beck, the chief
of the army general staff, courageously resigned
in protest at Hitler’s insistence that Czecho-
slovakia must be attacked regardless of the risks
of war with France. His successor was General
Halder. In August both Halder and Beck plotted
against Hitler and planned to arrest him before
he could plunge Germany into war. The attitude
of the majority of the army, including General
von Brauchitsch, the commander-in-chief, makes
it extremely doubtful whether the plot would
have succeeded had it ever materialised. It
depended in part on the appeal sent to London
secretly urging Chamberlain to stand firm. Not
unreasonably, Chamberlain was not prepared to
risk the issue of war and peace on the success of
a few conspirators in Germany.
Chamberlain was pursuing his own peaceful
policy. He induced the Czech government to
‘invite’ Lord Runciman early in August to assist
as ‘mediator’ in the negotiations between the
Czech government and Henlein. In view of
Hitler’s instructions to Henlein not to reach a
settlement the mission was futile from the start.
On 7 September Henlein broke off the negotia-
tions. Hitler now deliberately worked for his
pretext to attack Czechoslovakia, having carefully
made all the necessary military preparations. The
last stage of the German propaganda campaign
began with Hitler’s attack on President Benesˇ
in a speech to the faithful at Nürnberg. But
Chamberlain now began to interfere with Hitler’s
well-laid plans. Chamberlain’s personal diplo-
macy, his flight to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden
on 15 September, caught the public imagination
not only in Britain but also in Germany. He had
come to find out what Hitler wanted. The crisis
would be solved by diplomacy not force. The
Czechs were diplomatically bludgeoned into
agreeing on the cession of the Sudeten region to
Germany and the French were persuaded to
desert their Czech ally. But when Chamberlain
met Hitler with these fruits of his diplomacy on
a second occasion in Godesberg, the Führer
refused to give up the use of force and
Chamberlain broke off the negotiations. The
Czechs mobilised. It looked as if war might still
result.
1
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