What made Hitler draw back on the brink at
the end of September and forgo his Blitzkriegor
‘lightning war’? We can only surmise. He deliv-
ered another almost unbelievably insulting speech
abusing Benesˇ on 26 September. But the likeli-
hood of war with France and Britain made Hitler
hesitate. A probable major influence on his deci-
sion not to force a war was the ‘unsatisfactory’
state of German public opinion. Watching the
dramatic newsreels, the German cinema audiences
applauded the old gentleman with his umbrella so
determined to struggle for peace. The Germans
feared the consequences of another war with
Britain and France. And so Hitler allowed
Mussolini the glory of arranging for a peaceful
outcome. A conference was called at Munich and
Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier and Chamberlain
assembled on 29 September. By the early hours
of 30 September the formalities of arranging
for a German occupation of the Sudeten areas
between 1 and 10 October were agreed and a few
other details such as a declaration that what was
left of Czechoslovakia would be guaranteed once
the Poles and Hungarians too were satisfied.
Chamberlain even got Hitler to sign the piece of
paper he waved at the airport on his return to
Britain promising to settle all future Anglo-
German differences by diplomacy. The Czechs
were not allowed to participate. Nor were the
Russians, who in 1938 were still the sworn
Bolshevik enemies of Nazi Germany.
The new rump Czech–Slovak state did not last
long, although she tried to avoid all offence in
Germany. The Slovak autonomy movement
proved disruptive and in March 1939 Hitler
browbeat the Czech president Hacha in Berlin to
sign away what was left of the independence of
his country. Göring threatened that he would
otherwise obliterate Prague with bombs. The
Czech will to resist had already been broken at
Munich. On 15 March 1939 the Wehrmacht
moved in and Hitler hastened to Prague to savour
his new triumph. But his cynical breach of the
Munich settlement caused revulsion in the West
and the crowds that had so recently applauded
Chamberlain on his triumphant return from
Munich demanded that something should now
be done to stop Hitler. Thirty-five well-equipped
Czechoslovak divisions were lost to the French
ally. Could the French without a ‘second front’
in the east still check Germany on land? Fears
were voiced in the British Cabinet that France
might even abandon the British alliance and make
the best terms it could with Germany. These
worries drove both the Cabinet and the military
advisers of the government to accept the need for
a continental commitment. At the end of March
1939 plans were approved which would double
the strength of the British Territorial Army from
thirteen to twenty-six divisions.Britain’s foreign policy now had to be aligned to
the recently perceived shift in the balance of power
on the European continent. After initial hesita-
tions Chamberlain responded in a speech he deliv-
ered in Birmingham on 17 March 1939. He
accused Hitler of breaking his word and taking the
law into his own hands, and asked rhetorically:232 THE CONTINUING WORLD CRISIS, 1929–39
Hitler and Mussolini, 1938. © Bettmann/Corbis