would fight, despite the duce’s explanations that
Italy would not be ready for war for another three
years. The conquest of Abyssinia and the more
recent occupation of little Albania by Italian
troops (in April 1939) were one thing, war with
France and Britain quite a different prospect. The
alliance nevertheless served the purpose of
dashing any hopes Chamberlain might have had
left of detaching Italy from Germany after his
own abortive attempt to achieve this on a visit to
Rome the previous January. It was intended to
pressurise Britain into neutrality. Far more
important was the conclusion on 23 August of a
Nazi–Soviet pact, which Hitler hoped would con-
vince Britain and France that it was useless to
fight for Poland.
August 1939 turned out to be the last full
month of peace. The crisis started when Poland
insisted on its treaty rights in Danzig and Hitler
chose to regard this as a provocation. However,
Danzig was not the real issue; nor even was the
future of the territory lying between East Prussia
and the rest of Germany – the Polish corridor.
Rather, it was that Hitler could not tolerate an
independent Poland which blocked his road to
Lebensraumin the east. The Poles were not
impressed either by efforts at intimidating them
by the Nazis on the one hand and pressure to be
‘reasonable’ exerted by Britain and France on the
other. They had no intention of suffering the fate
of Czechoslovakia. But the Chamberlain Cabinet
in London and Daladier’s government vainly
hoped that the dispute was about no more than
Danzig and the corridor and that war could be
avoided if Poland gave way.
However, from Hitler’s point of view, war
with France and Britain would only be post-
poned, not avoided, that is postponed until he
decided that the balance of power was most
advantageously in Germany’s favour. To the
extent that one can fathom Hitler’s mind, war
with Poland was by now a certainty. He told his
commanders-in-chief on 22 August that the
destruction of Poland was necessary even if it
meant conflict with Britain and France. He added
that he did not believe it likely that Britain and
France would go to war. What was desirable,
politically and militarily, was not a settling of all
accounts, but concentration on single tasks.
Hitler had no intention of allowing the British or
French any role as mediators.
According to Hitler’s original plans, the attack
on Poland was to begin on 26 August. On 25
August at 3 p.m. the order to attack was given
and then, much to the annoyance of the Wehrma-
cht countermanded at 7 p.m. when the final
troop movements were already under way. The
attack was postponed by Hitler for a few days.
How significant was the postponement? Was
there a real chance of peace somehow missed
by lack of communication or misunderstanding?
Chamberlain was aware of the parallel with July
- In a personal letter to Hitler on 22 August
he made it clear that Britain would stand by its
Polish commitments regardless of the German–
Soviet pact. Hitler received the letter on 23
August. The flurry of negotiations principally
between London and Berlin during the last days
of peace were undertaken by Britain to induce
Germany and Poland to negotiate the differences
over Danzig and the corridor. In that respect
there was a parallel between the Czech crisis of
1938 and the Polish crisis. Britain and France
would have acquiesced in any territorial gains
Germany succeeded in obtaining from Poland
without use of force. Mere German blackmail had
become almost an acceptable fact of life as far as
diplomacy was concerned. But if Germany
attacked Poland to gain her ends by force then
there was no doubt that Britain would support
Poland by declaring war on Germany. The British
Cabinet knew no other policy was possible and
that the country would not accept another
Munich, especially with the Poles, unlike the
Czechs, fighting for their country. In France,
Daladier firmly controlled his government and
Bonnet, the foreign minister, counted for little
now; there was no doubt here, too, that an actual
German invasion of Poland meant war.
That is not to say that Britain and France
wanted to fight Germany. Quite the contrary; the
two governments were ready to talk and negoti-
ate as long as Hitler did not actually attack. There
was no certainty in their minds that he would
actually go to war – so talk they did from 25
August until the outbreak of war with Poland,
1
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN EUROPE, 1937–9 235
