tentiary to present himself in Berlin expired at
midnight on 30 August. The Poles were not pre-
pared to rush cap in hand to Hitler.
Polish policy has been characterised as suicidal.
How could the Poles hope to maintain their inde-
pendence sandwiched, as they were, between
Germany and the Soviet Union? It is perfectly
true that Poland’s military situation in September
1939 was hopeless. The Poles overrated their
capacity to resist in the short term. So did the
French commander-in-chief, General Gamelin,
who expected the Poles to be able to hold out
until the following spring. The Poles also counted
on effective help from France and Britain. There
was logic and reason in Poland’s refusal to con-
template significant concessions to Germany in
- The recent example of Czechoslovakia
showed only too clearly that independence could
not be bought for long by making concessions to
Hitler. Once started on that road, the Poles
believed with good reason, the end at best would
be that they might be permitted to remain
Germany’s satellite. So they reasoned that if the
Germans intended the destruction of Polish inde-
pendence, it would be better to fight them at the
outset with Britain and France as allies than to
accept piecemeal subordination to Germany and
to risk the loss of the French and British alliance.
Furthermore, there was just the possibility that
Hitler’s objectives were limited to Danzig and
access, through the Polish corridor. For such aims
alone, Hitler, so they thought, might not risk a
great European war. But if his aims were not
limited, then Poland’s only choice was to submit
or fight. Accordingly the Polish government came
to the conclusion that Poland’s national interests
were best served by resisting Hitler’s territorial
demands, by holding tight and so testing his real
intentions. Hitler’s determination, the Poles
vainly hoped, might crack if his policy was based
on bluff.
Did this Polish attitude then dash hopes of a
peaceful settlement? That would have been so
only to the extent that, if the Polish government
had submitted to whatever Hitler demanded in
August 1939, then France and Britain would have
had no cause for war in September 1939. But
while the British Cabinet and the French govern-
ment were anxious for the Poles to explore all pos-
sibilities of a peaceful settlement with Germany by
opening direct negotiations with Hitler, they did
not expect the Poles simply to submit to time lim-
its and the threat of force. Hitler, too, would have
to demonstrate Germany’s desire for peace by
putting forward reasonable terms for a settlement,
and by negotiating in a reasonable way without
ultimatums.
At first sight he appeared to be putting forward
what in London and Paris might be considered
‘reasonable’ terms. The German demands were
embodied in sixteen points; they struck the
British ambassador in Berlin as moderate, when
he eventually heard what they were. They
included the immediate takeover by Germany of
Danzig and a plebiscite later in the corridor to
decide whether it was to remain Polish or become
German, with the loser being granted extra-
territorial rights across the strip of territory. But
the method of negotiation belied the apparent
moderation of the sixteen points. They were
drawn up in strict secrecy and not communicated
until after the time set for the appearance in
Berlin of a Polish plenipotentiary with full powers
to negotiate. In fact, they first reached the ears of
the British ambassador just after midnight – in the
early hours of 31 August. Henderson had called
on the German foreign minister, Ribbentrop,
who after a stormy discussion pulled a piece of
paper out of his pocket and then read the sixteen
demands aloud in German, according to
Henderson, at ‘top speed’. Ribbentrop added
that since no Pole had arrived they were super-
seded anyway. He refused the ambassador’s
request for a copy. Henderson was astonished at
this breach of diplomatic practice and had to rely
on his memory for the gist of the proposals.
Henderson in Berlin, and Halifax in London,
nevertheless tried to persuade the Poles to act
quickly to open discussions in Berlin. Not until
noon on 31 August did Dahlerus, the innocent
intermediary, who was being used by Göring and
Hitler in an attempt to keep Britain out of the
war, communicate the full terms to the British
and Polish ambassadors in Berlin. All the efforts
of the professional and amateur diplomats were in
vain. The sixteen points and Hitler’s diplomatic
1
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