the Royal Navy on 8 April was proceeding to lay
mines in Norwegian territorial waters accompa-
nied by a small force of troops which was ready
to land in Norway should the Germans retaliate
by invading. In fact, they had already anticipated
the British move. The instructions to the British
force were unclear and reveal Britain’s moral
dilemma about landing in Norway if the
Norwegians chose to resist.
Only in the extreme north, in Narvik, were
Anglo-French forces able to inflict a temporary
setback to the small German forces far from their
base. The British navy sank the German destroy-
ers in the port and a month later Narvik was reoc-
cupied. After Dunkirk, these forces had to be
withdrawn and the whole of Norway fell under
German occupation. Nevertheless, German naval
losses had been so severe that in July 1940 there
was no surface fleet in active service; only a few
lighter warships were undamaged.
The most important political consequence of act-
ing too late in Norway was the fall of the
Chamberlain Cabinet, and the outcome – surpris-
ing at the time of the crisis – was that Winston
Churchill became prime minister on 10 May 1940
of a national government joined by Labour and
the Liberals. With the passage of time the adula-
tion of Churchill as war leader has rightly given
place to a more critical assessment of his role in
policy making at home, in foreign relations and in
military strategy, which together make up the con-
duct of the war. Churchill’s shortcomings stand
revealed. By filling in the shadows, showing his
mistakes as well as his successes, Churchill
becomes more real and believable. The shadows
only bring into sharper relief the predominance of
that galvanising spirit, the enormous energy and
undaunted faith in final victory that became an
asset of inestimable value to Britain and to the war
effort of the whole alliance. And, despite wartime
restrictions, Churchill still led a democracy rooted
in Parliament, and was dependent upon the sup-
port of the people. The nation thrilled by the
rhetoric of his radio speeches and sensed that
Britain now had a war leader who was a match for
Hitler. Churchill, more than any single man, sus-
tained national morale and hope in the future.
It is therefore all the more remarkable that the
secrets now emerging from private papers and
official records reveal how insecure Churchill’s
position really was during the first four months of
his administration. Chamberlain was no broken
reed. His government had actually won what
amounted to a vote of confidence, though many
Conservatives had abstained or voted with the
Opposition. Chamberlain was deeply injured by
so many of his former supporters turning against
him. It was he who decided that for the ‘dura-
tion’ what was required was a truly national gov-
ernment. But he would remain leader of the
Conservative Party and thought that he might
return to power when sanity returned; the time
would come when his unrivalled experience
would be needed to bring back peace. As yet he
had no inkling of the cancer that, within a few
weeks, turned him into an invalid and caused his
death early in November 1940. Churchill was
prime minister, but Chamberlain and Halifax
remained the most powerful Conservatives in the
Cabinet. When Churchill first presented himself244 THE SECOND WORLD WAR
A war leader. Winston Churchill, 1941. © Bettmann/
Corbis