In short, German victory was due to the bril-
liance of the amended war-plan carried out in
May 1940, its successful execution by the German
high command and the fighting qualities of the
well-trained troops, particularly the Panzer divi-
sions. Obversely, Allied failure was primarily a
failure of strategy. French armies were thrown
into total confusion, their generals lost control
over communications and over the movements of
whole armies. No soldier can successfully fight in
such a situation, except in local actions. Later, the
generals and politicians were quick to blame all
sorts of factors – the communists, sabotage, poor
equipment, low morale – as having greatly con-
tributed to defeat. The blame must lie over-
whelmingly with Gamelin and the Allied generals
themselves.
The devastating timetable of defeat can be
tersely set out. On 10 May 1940 the Germans
launched the western offensive, simultaneously
attacking the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxem-
bourg. The terror-bombing and destruction of
Rotterdam added a new term to the war vocab-
ulary. The French and British troops moved
forward according to a plan which, as it turned
out, placed them more securely in the noose. On
13 May the Germans broke through on the
Meuse. The French prime minister Reynaud tele-
phoned Churchill the following day telling him
that the situation was grave, and on the 15th that
the battle was lost, the way to Paris open.
The first rift now appeared between the British
and French conduct of the war. The French
wanted the outcome of the whole war to depend
on the battle for France. Churchill already foresaw
that if indeed the battle for France was lost the
war would go on. There would then be the battle
for Britain. So 15 May 1940 is an important date.
Reynaud appealed to Britain to throw the whole
of its air force into the battle as the only chance
left to stop the Germans. Churchill and the
Cabinet were ready to send further squadrons of
fighters to France. But twenty-five squadrons
would be retained as indispensable for the defence
of Britain, as the commander-in-chief of fighter
command, Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding,
insisted that this represented the minimum nec-
essary protection. On 15 May, to Reynaud’s des-
perate plea, Churchill responded: ‘we would do
everything we could, but we could not denude
England of her essential defences’.
On 16 May Churchill crossed the Channel to
see the situation for himself and to infuse some
of his fighting spirit into Reynaud’s government.
The full disaster became evident, there was near
panic in Paris. Gamelin was dismissed and
replaced by General Weygand on 19 May. But
Hitler had slowed the advance to the Channel.
He did not wish to risk his tanks in unsuitable
terrain; to Göring and his Luftwaffe was to be left
a share in annihilating the trapped British. The
tanks were temporarily halted. General de Gaulle,
of later fame, managed a small-scale counter-
attack on 17 May but it could not affect the
outcome of the battle. In the north the BEF and
French divisions were retreating in good order –
much too slowly. On 20 May Reynaud had
brought Marshal Pétain into his new government.
Defeat was in the air. On 24 May the German
Panzers reached the coast at Abbeville on the
mouth of the Somme. The Allied northern armies
were now cut off.
The story of the French capitulation is well
known. Increasingly the French began to blame
the British for not throwing their last reserves into
the battle. They could not conceive how Britain
would continue the war without France. Churchill
was back in Paris on 23 May to discover how the
northern Allied armies including the BEF might
be saved. It was trapped, he reported back to the
War Cabinet in London the next day. On 25 May,
General Lord Gort, the commander of the BEF,
in spite of instructions on the 19th from Churchill
and the chiefs of staff to link with the French,
independently began the manoeuvre, subse-
quently approved, that eventually made it possible
to save the British divisions, and many French
troops too, from the beaches of Dunkirk. Wey-
gand’s planned counter-offensive against the
German flanks never had a chance; there were no
French forces left who could seriously threaten the
Germans. Meanwhile in Paris on the night of 25
May Pétain and other members of the govern-
ment were already searching for a way to conclude
a separate peace with Germany. Prime Minister
Reynaud was despatched to London to sound out