Mussolini with offers including the neutralisation
of Gibraltar and Suez as well as the demilitarisa-
tion of Malta. But Churchill wanted no approach
to Italy. He knew how easily this could slide into
peace negotiations with Germany. He told
Reynaud that Britain would not give up on any
account but would rather go down fighting than
be enslaved to Germany.
After further discussions with the French
prime minister, the British Cabinet reassembled
in the afternoon. Halifax urged that the media-
tion of Mussolini be sought; Hitler, he observed,
might not present such unreasonable terms.
Churchill repeatedly opposed such a move. In the
diary Chamberlain kept of these vital hours he
records Churchill as saying:
It was incredible that Hitler would consent to
any terms that we could accept though if we
could get out of this jam by giving up Malta
and some African colonies he would jump at
it. But the only safe way was to convince Hitler
that he could not beat us. We might do better
without the French than with them if they tied
us to a conference into which we should enter
with our case lost beforehand.What are we to make of Churchill’s remark that
‘he would jump’ at the chance of getting out of
the war? If this one remark is considered out of
context it might appear that not much separated
Churchill from Halifax. But Churchill’s actions
throughout these critical days, and all the argu-
ments he marshalled, make it absurd to suppose
that he had any other intention but that of defeat-
ing Halifax and of winning over the remaining
Cabinet ministers in order to fight on. An
approach to Mussolini, Churchill warned, would
not only be futile but would involve Britain in
‘deadly danger’; ‘let us therefore avoid being
dragged down the slippery slope with France’.
Nevertheless, in making an effort to appear
reasonable, by apparent concessions to Halifax’s
arguments, Churchill was manoeuvred into a dan-
gerous corner at the Cabinet meeting on the fol-
lowing day, 27 May. He reiterated his view that
no attempt should be made to start any negotia-
tions by way of Mussolini. Halifax, who was a
formidable opponent, now accused Churchill of
inconsistency, saying that when on the previous
day he had asked him whether he were satisfied
that if matters vital to Britain’s independence
were unaffected he would be prepared to discuss
terms, Churchill had then replied that ‘he would
be thankful to get out of our present difficulties
on such terms, provided we retained the essen-
tials and the elements of our vital strength, even
at the cost of some cession of territory’. Yet now,
Halifax pointed out, Churchill spoke only of
fighting to a finish. Churchill was flustered; he
attempted to reconcile what could not be recon-
ciled by saying, ‘If Herr Hitler were prepared to
make peace on the terms of the restoration of the
German colonies and the overlordship of Central
Europe, that was one thing. But it was quite
unlikely that he would make any such offer.’
Halifax immediately followed up his advantage,
pressing Churchill by asking him whether he
would be willing to discuss Hitler’s terms.
Churchill rather feebly responded that: ‘He
would not join France in asking for terms; but if
he were told what the terms offered were, he
would be prepared to consider them.’ The
Cabinet ended. Churchill had gained just one
important point: Britain would not initiate direct
negotiations with Hitler.
The Cabinet met again on 28 May. Halifax
once more, on the pretext of starting negotiations
to keep Italy out of the war, was trying to find a
way of discussing peace with Hitler’s Germany.
The War Cabinet well understood this. The real
difference between Halifax and Churchill was sim-
ple. Halifax believed the war already lost; to fight
on would entail useless sacrifice. What he actually
said was that Britain might get better terms before
France left the war and before Britain’s aircraft fac-
tories were bombed by the Luftwaffe. The Italian
Embassy now wanted to know, Halifax said,
whether ‘we should like mediation by Italy’.
Churchill retorted that Britain could not negotiate
from weakness; ‘the position would be entirely
different when Germany had made an unsuccess-
ful attempt to invade the country’, he added, and
he argued that even if defeated later Britain would
get no worse terms than now. A nation that went
down fighting would rise again whereas those that