tamely surrendered were finished. Any negotia-
tions, furthermore, would undermine the nation’s
morale. Churchill was supported by both Attlee
and Greenwood. Halifax contemptuously accused
Churchill of indulging in rhetorical heroics. But
the decisive voice was Chamberlain’s.
Chamberlain had been deeply shocked by the
debacle in France. The basis on which he had con-
ducted the war had been shattered. In his diary a
little over a week before these crucial Cabinet dis-
cussions he had noted that he expected a German
ultimatum, and that it might be necessary to fight
on but that: ‘We should be fighting only for bet-
ter terms not for victory.’ Chamberlain thought
with Halifax that realism could only lead to the
conclusion that the war was lost. But he jibbed at
bribing Mussolini while Britain and Germany
remained at war. On the issue of whether
Mussolini’s help should be invoked to bring
Germany, France and Britain to the conference
table his views fluctuated. Halifax worked hard on
him to get him to force Churchill’s hand.
Chamberlain, however, attempted to reconcile
Halifax and Churchill. In addressing the Cabinet,
Chamberlain said on 28 May:
He felt bound to say that he was in agreement
with the Foreign Secretary in taking the view
that if we thought it was possible that we now
get terms, which, although grievous, would
not threaten our independence, we should be
right to consider such terms.
But, he added, he did not think the French idea
of an approach to Mussolini would produce
‘decent terms’, especially with France in Hitler’s
grasp. Chamberlain therefore said he had come to
the conclusion that an ‘approach to Italy was
useless at the present time, it might be that we
should take a different view in a short time, pos-
sibly even a week hence’. Churchill had won, at
least for the time being.
One cannot say with certainty what would
have happened if Chamberlain, not Churchill,
had been prime minister. Halifax might then have
carried the day. The impression the documents
leave is that Chamberlain had acted less from con-
viction than out of loyalty to the prime minister.
The Cabinet adjourned at 6.15 p.m. Churchill
had called a meeting of the ministers not in the
War Cabinet to his room in the House of
Commons that evening. He told them that ‘of
course whatever happens at Dunkirk, we shall
fight on’. He reported back to the reassembled
War Cabinet at 7 p.m. that his message had been
greeted with enthusiasm. Churchill then agreed
to a long and tactful message to be sent to
Reynaud explaining that Halifax’s ‘formula’ pre-
pared on the occasion of Reynaud’s visit two days
previously, which had contemplated asking
Mussolini to act as mediator, was now dead; ‘we
are convinced that at this moment when Hitler is
flushed with victory... it would be impossible
for Signor Mussolini to put forward proposals for
a conference with any success’.
Churchill’s victory would not be final as long
as Halifax remained in the Cabinet and could
influence Chamberlain. Indeed the following day
the foreign secretary challenged Churchill’s
fighting despatch to Lord Gort. Halifax wanted a
despatch sent that left to Gort’s judgement the
decision whether to surrender the BEF. ‘It would
not be dishonourable to relinquish the struggle,
in order to save a handful of men from massacre.’
Churchill was not strong enough to offer outright
opposition to such defeatism but evaded the issue
by asking for time to consider the position. The
evacuation from Dunkirk soon made any recon-
sideration unnecessary. Churchill was successfully
playing for time.
In mid-June 1940, with the imminent with-
drawal of France from the war, there were more
anxious moments for Churchill. In July Hitler in
a speech finally called on Britain to be reasonable
and to make peace. At the same time he mocked
Churchill, whose position was still far from
assured. On 2 August, the king of Sweden
secretly offered his mediation but the Cabinet on
7 August approved Halifax’s reply which made
Germany’s withdrawal from all its conquests a
precondition. The full story of continuing
attempts by those under Churchill to seek peace
remains to be told but there is no reason to doubt
Chamberlain’s continued loyalty to the prime
minister. It enabled Churchill to survive and to
neutralise his opponents.
1
GERMANY’S WARS OF CONQUEST IN EUROPE, 1939–41 249
