in Roosevelt’s mind. He was sensitive to
American public opinion, which increasingly
demanded tough measures, short of war, to
restrain Japan from ousting US commerce from
China. Yet, with war raging across the Atlantic,
Roosevelt genuinely wished to preserve peace in
the Pacific for as long as possible, though not on
Japan’s terms. The US possessed powerful retal-
iatory economic weapons: the American market
for Japanese goods, American raw materials essen-
tial to Japan, including oil, and capital for
Japanese industry. Secretary of State Cordell Hull
advised caution in applying any economic sanc-
tions; but some of Roosevelt’s other advisers,
including the powerful secretary of the treasury,
Henry Morgenthau, believed that Japan would
have to accept American conditions for a just
settlement in China once the US made use of its
economic muscle, for oil and raw materials were
essential to sustain a Japanese war against the
West. Roosevelt followed an uncertain middle
course. In July 1939, the Japanese were informed
that the treaty of commerce with the US would
be terminated in January 1940. This was the first
tentative application of economic pressure and
shocked the Japanese leaders. After its termina-
tion it would be possible to impose sanctions
other than ‘moral embargoes’.
With the defeat of the Netherlands and France
by Germany in the summer of 1940, the chances
of peace in the Pacific grew less. French and
Dutch possessions in south-east Asia now became
tempting targets for Japan, which cast covetous
eyes particularly on the Dutch East Indies with
their valuable raw materials of tin, rubber and
oil. But the American administration made clear
that it would regard any change in the status quo
of these European possessions as endangering
American interests and peace in the Pacific. In
1940 Japan increased the pressure on France and
Britain to block aid to China. Vichy France had
to accept the stationing of Japanese troops in
northern Indo-China and for a time Britain
agreed to close the Burma Road along which sup-
plies had been sent to Nationalist China. If the
US were not prepared to use its economic
weapons, then, the British argued, there was
nothing left for them to do but to attempt to
appease Japan.
In July 1940, Roosevelt took a second step to
apply economic pressure on Japan. He ordered
that the export of petrol suitable for aviation fuel
be restricted, in addition to lubricants and high-
grade scrap metal. Although this was intended as a
limited embargo, there were those in Washington
who, rightly as it turned out, foretold that turning
the screw would not make for peace but would
lead the Japanese in desperation to attack the
Dutch East Indies. Roosevelt was well aware of
the danger and characteristically wanted to apply
some pressure but not push Japan too hard. The
Tripartite Pact, which Japan, Germany and
Italy concluded in September 1940, hardened
Roosevelt’s attitude. In a speech soon after the
conclusion of the pact, Roosevelt declared: ‘No
combination of dictator countries of Europe and
Asia will stop the help we are giving to... those
who resist aggression, and who now hold the
aggressors far from our shores.’ All the same, from
the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941
Roosevelt attempted to dampen down the crisis in
the Pacific. He gave some additional help to
China, but also urged restraint on Japan. He also
made it clear that he was still willing and anxious to
negotiate a settlement. Meanwhile he rejected
Churchill’s urging that the US and Britain should
jointly take steps so that the Japanese should be
left in no doubt that further aggression in Asia
meant war.
Negotiations got under way in Washington
between the Japanese ambassador Nomura and
Secretary of State Cordell Hull in the spring of- Meanwhile, the Japanese signed a neutral-
ity pact with the Soviet Union and were extend-
ing their military bases to southern Indo-China in
the obvious direction of the Dutch East Indies.
A crucial decision was taken in Tokyo that
affected the whole course of world history. The
plan to strike north from China and join Germany
in the war against the Soviet Union was rejected.
Japan would advance to the south to secure the
raw materials vital to its own needs. An imperial
conference on 2 July 1941 gave its seal of
approval to that decision. The goal was the Dutch
East Indies. Japan did not wish to go to war with
the US and the British Empire. Its diplomats
would try to convince London and Washington