that for Japan this was a question of survival. If
Britain and the US, however, opposed the south-
ern drive, the Japanese Empire would not shrink
from war either.
Roosevelt proposed that, if Japan withdrew
from southern French Indo-China, the raw mater-
ials it needed could be guaranteed by the powers
and the region would be neutralised. What
impressed the Japanese more was the order freez-
ing Japanese funds in the US and an American
trade embargo which, despite Roosevelt’s initial
intentions, included oil. But Roosevelt’s object
was still to avoid war in the Pacific, while somehow
getting the US in on the side of Britain in Europe.
After the German invasion of Russia during the
summer of 1941, he also ordered that ways be
found to provide all-out aid to the Soviet Union.
So when in mid-August 1941 Nomura sug-
gested the continuation of informal negotiations
to settle American–Japanese differences, Roosevelt
agreed. Nomura suggested a meeting between
Prime Minister Konoe and the American presi-
dent. Roosevelt was excited by the idea, but fol-
lowed the advice of the State Department and
insisted that first the Japanese government should
accept a number of basic propositions: they should
desist from a southern drive of conquest (that is,
in the direction of the Dutch East Indies), they
should agree to withdraw troops from China and
to give up any economic discrimination, and they
should detach themselves from the Tripartite Pact.
All but one of these preconditions were entirely
unacceptable to the Japanese. They might have
been willing to halt their southern expansion on
their own terms, but not to make any but token
withdrawals from China.
What the Americans were really demanding
was the Japanese abandonment of the basic tenets
of their co-prosperity sphere. The negotiations
dragged on through October and November.
The gulf between the Japanese and American
concepts of the future peace of eastern Asia was
as wide as ever, despite the search by the diplo-
mats for some middle ground. As late as mid-
November 1941, Roosevelt was searching
without success for a compromise that would lead
to a postponement of war for at least six months.
This shows that for Roosevelt, in any case,
Germany still came first, but his judgements
proved very changeable.
In Tokyo the basic countdown to war was
decided upon at the Imperial Conference which
took place on 6 September 1941. Prime Minister
Konoe opened the meeting saying that Japan
must complete its war preparations, but that
diplomacy should be given a last chance to resolve
peacefully the problems facing it. If diplomacy
failed, and only a limited time could be allowed
for its success, then Japan must fight a war of self-
defence. The US’s conditions for a settlement,
involving not only a barrier to the southern drive
of Japan but also American insistence that Japan
withdraw its troops from China and abandon its
demands for exclusive economic control, were,
Konoe claimed, tantamount to denying Japan’s
right to exist as an equal and Asian power.
Without oil and a certain source of essential raw
materials Japan was at the mercy of foreign
powers. That was Japan’s interpretation of the
American proposals for a peaceful settlement.
The chief of naval staff, Admiral Nagumo Osami,
moreover, was confident that the Japanese navy’s
early victories would place Japan in an ‘invincible
position’ even in a long war. The Japanese army
chief of staff urged the opening of hostilities as
soon as possible while Japan still enjoyed a rela-
tive military advantage. The tone of the confer-
ence was therefore that war with the US and
Britain would become inevitable unless American
policy rapidly altered course. In October, Konoe
resigned and made way for a new government
headed by General Hideki Tojo, a clear indication
that the moment for war was drawing close.
The outcome of these Tokyo conferences
became known in Washington from the inter-
cepted instructions cabled from Tokyo to Ambas-
sador Nomura, who was still negotiating with
Cordell Hull in Washington. The Japanese code
had been broken by the Americans, who were now
privy to the Japanese secrets. They thus learnt that
the Japanese had a time limit in mind for the
success of these negotiations. Furthermore, that
there could be no question of any genuine
Japanese withdrawal from China and that when
the time limit expired the Japanese army and navy
would extend the war by continuing their drive
1
THE CHINA WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF THE PACIFIC WAR, 1937–41 261
