of 1914–18. Behind the fighting fronts, the indus-
trial war was waged, pouring out guns, tanks, air-
craft and ships. One of the most intriguing aspects
of the war was that of spies and of science. Despite
spectacular coups, the achievement of the spies
in affecting the course of the war was less than
might have been expected. The success of espi-
onage and counter-espionage meant that they
tended to cancel each other out. One of the best-
known illustrations of this was the failure of
Richard Sorge, the master spy working for the
Russians in Tokyo, to convince Moscow that his
information from the German Embassy of Hitler’s
intentions and the timing of the invasion of
the Soviet Union was true. On the Allied side
demonstrable vital espionage success, was the
breaking of the German code machine Enigma,
used by Germany’s armed forces. The Poles had
built a replica and just before the start of the
war passed its secret to the British, who contin-
ued the decyphering work at Bletchley Park. The
intelligence data, codenamed ‘Ultra’, thus helped
Britain and its allies in the air war, in the
Mediterranean and in the North African cam-
paigns, but most crucially in the battle of the
Atlantic.
The Allies derived huge advantage from their
successful application of science to warfare. Radar
was in use early in the war in both Germany and
Britain; Germany was probably ahead in its devel-
opment at the outset of the war. But during
1940–1 small airborne radar sets were produced
in Britain which allowed night fighters to defend
cities during the Blitz. Airborne radar also became
an indispensable adjunct to the Allied bomber
offensive, enabling the bombers to pinpoint their
targets at night. At sea, advanced types of radar
gave the Allies a decisive advantage against
German submarines in the spring of 1943 and
helped to turn the tide of battle in their favour.
But the scientific breakthrough that did most
to shape the future was the atomic bomb; the
decision at the end of the war to use this weapon
brought about the rapid Japanese surrender.
Allied scientists from many nations, British,
American, French, Danish, Italian and German
too (for German refugees played a crucial role),
made the construction of a nuclear bomb possi-
ble. It was eventually in the US that science was
matched by the technical know-how and the pro-
duction facilities necessary for its manufacture
were provided. First tested in the empty spaces of
the New Mexican desert, the bomb was dropped
just three weeks later in August 1945 over
Hiroshima.
An early indication of Allied suspicions about
the likely post-war attitude of the Soviet Union
can be seen in the decision not to share the secrets
of nuclear development with the USSR. Indeed,
despite an agreement with Britain, the US sought
to retain a monopoly on the manufacture of these
awesome weapons. The Soviets were well aware
they would need to develop their own atomic
bomb and in 1942, despite the immediate
German threat, pressed ahead vigorously with
their own research. The Danish atomic scientist
Niels Bohr advised Roosevelt that the Russians
would succeed in building their own bomb some
time after the Americans did so. Would it not be
better to share secrets with them and to work for
international control? The Russians made their
own bomb in 1949. The atom spy Klaus Fuchs
had provided some help but the Russians could
eventually have built their own bomb in any case.
It seems unlikely that the course of Stalin’s policy
would have differed much even if the Americans
had passed on the atomic secrets. German atomic
research – despite the eminence of some of the
scientists ready to work for the Nazis – lagged
behind. Hitler, according to the armaments min-
ister Albert Speer, was not prepared to earmark
the vast resources necessary to make the bomb,
regarding nuclear physics as ‘Jewish physics’.
Instead, the Germans did devote great resources
to the development of new rockets, which by
themselves could have no decisive effect on
the war. The outcome was the pilotless plane, the
V-1, and the advanced supersonic rocket, the
V-2, against which there was no defence when
it came into use in 1944.
In the summer of 1940 it was difficult to see how
Germany’s victorious armies would ever be
defeated. But by attacking the Soviet Union in
June 1941 and then declaring war that December
on the US the balance potentially swung against
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