integrated into the Soviet system. One-party
communist states tied to the Soviet party
remained the goal. To reach it, Stalin had to over-
come the obstacle not only of Western opposition
but more seriously of the intense nationalism of
the ethnic groups living in this region of Europe.
It proved impossible to extinguish the loyalties to
their own countries of Yugoslavs, Hungarians,
Poles and Romanians. Their acceptance of the
communist embrace, despite genuine gratitude
for their liberation, fell far short of seeing in the
Soviet Union a desirable overlord. Polish history
had consisted of the struggle for freedom from
Russia; the powerful Catholic Churches in both
Poland and Hungary identified themselves with
their countries’ national feelings. Added to such
opposition was the resistance to the social and
economic revolution demanded by the commu-
nists. The relationship between the Soviet Union
and its allies in the socialist camp thus moved
uneasily between attempts at rigid party and
Soviet control and relaxation of that control to
the extent of limited independence.
The central and East European states through
which in 1944 and 1945 the Red Army march-
ed on its way to Vienna and Berlin can be
divided into two groups: the Allied nations, Po-
land, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and technically
Albania too; and the former enemies, Bulgaria,
Romania and Hungary. The ability of Britain and
the US to intercede effectively for allies was, para-
doxically, smaller than the ability to secure some
say in the future of the enemies. In the case of
allies, the only option was to withhold recogni-
tion of the government installed by the Russians
in 1945 only for recognition to be granted two
years later.
Over the future Czechoslovakia, Allied influ-
ence was especially weak. President Benesˇ had
decided that Czechoslovakia’s post-war future left
no choice but to accept Soviet ‘friendship’, which
meant acquiescing in whatever limits Stalin chose
to place on its independence. Benesˇ was rewarded
by being the only Allied head of state to return
to his own country by way of Moscow. As for
Yugoslavia, the royal government in exile could
not conceivably be re-established without the
support of a large Allied army, for Tito and his
communist partisans had assumed control of the
country, moreover without direct Soviet help.
The position of the enemies, of Hungary,
Romania and Bulgaria, was different, although
each was under Red Army occupation. Their gov-
ernments and frontiers could not be regularised
without peace treaties involving the consent of
Britain and the US. The Allies kept up a constant
stream of protest at the undemocratic conduct of
these regimes set up by the Soviet Union and
withheld their recognition and their signature to
the peace treaties until 1947.
In Poland, which he recognised as the most
vulnerable country under Soviet control, Stalin
kept the tightest grip, making few concessions.
Poland remained under the thinly veiled direct
military occupation of the Red Army. The Polish
army, which had accompanied the Red Army, was
largely officered by reliable Soviet officers. In the
new communist-dominated government, the only
politician with a considerable following was
Stanislav Mikolajczyk, a non-communist and
leader of the Peasant Party who had joined the
Lublin government from London and now served
as a deputy prime minister. The communist secre-
tary of the Polish Workers’ Party, Wladyslaw
Gomulka, was the real power in Poland. The
communists adopted their usual tactics of
attempting to secure the agreement of the Peasant
Party and the non-communist coalition partners
to elections on a ‘single list’; this meant the voters
would be presented not with a choice of parties,
but with one agreed list of candidates, of which
the Peasant Party and others would be allowed
only a minority. Stalin had promised the Western
Allies early free elections. But, because the com-
munists could not guarantee the results in 1945
despite holding key internal ministries and con-
trolling the police, the army and much of the
administration, they simply postponed the elec-
tions for two years. During these years there was
open violence and armed struggle.
The Home Army, operating in Poland but loyal
to the London government in exile, was dissolved
in July 1945. Embittered by their experiences,
some desperate units went underground again and
with a few thousand members of the Ukrainian
Independence Army began terrorist attacks on