control. The monolithic Soviet empire cracked for
all the world to see.
The road to total communist power was different
again in Czechoslovakia. Edvard Benesˇ, the
president of the Czech government in exile in
London, had signed a formal alliance and friend-
ship treaty with the Soviet Union in December
1943 by which the Russians undertook not to
interfere in Czechoslovakia’s internal affairs. But
Stalin had already established a communist émigré
group in Moscow, led by Klement Gottwald. The
experience of Munich in 1938, when Britain and
France had forced the Czechs to give in to Hitler’s
territorial demands, had convinced Benesˇ that he
should stay on good terms with the Russians,
because Western protection could not be relied
upon. He hoped that by demonstrating the
Czechs’ genuine friendship he would be allowed
to maintain democracy and Western values. He
saw Czechoslovakia’s role as forming a bridge
between East and West. As if to emphasise Czech
reliance on the Soviet Union, Benesˇ returned to
Czechoslovakia via Moscow in the spring of 1945.
Ominously he now had to agree to new terms
which further limited his freedom of action.
The government in exile would be replaced by a
new National Front government for liberated
Czechoslovakia in which only the parties of the left
would participate, and key ministries for the inter-
nal control of the country would be in communist
hands. In return, Benesˇ received Stalin’s empty
promise that the Soviet leader would deal with any
communists who gave him trouble. Benesˇ had also
to agree to a social and economic transformation
(designed to pave the way to communism) and to
the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. Real
democracy through representative government
was not re-established in 1945, only its appear-
ance. Czechoslovakia was bound to follow the
Soviet Union in any policy Stalin regarded as
important, even before the communist takeover in
1948; the Czech recantation of participation in the
Marshall Aid Programme in 1947, on Moscow’s
insistence, was a good illustration of this.
The Czech communist leader, Klement
Gottwald, was told by Moscow to content himself
with a gradual path to absolute power. During
the war the communists had organised a resis-
tance movement against the Germans; after it
they not only held the key ministries and domin-
ated the trade unions, but established their
national committees in villages, towns and
provinces. Economic transformation began with
the nationalisation of large industries and busi-
nesses even before the provisional parliament met
in October 1945. But later that month the
American forces and the Red Army, who had
jointly liberated the country, agreed to withdraw,
giving hope to the democrats, although the
country was split between the communists and
the democratic parties of the left. Elections were
held in May 1946, but they were not absolutely
free since only the parties comprising the National
Front were allowed to participate. Furthermore,
many Czechs feared that, if the communists failed
to win, the Red Army would return. Given all
their preparatory work and control, it is hardly
surprising that the communists polled 37 per cent
of the votes. But, even with their fellow travellers
among the Social Democratic Party, this did not
give them absolute control. Nonetheless the
democratic opposition, stronger in Slovakia than
Bohemia and Moravia, was weakened by being
split among three parties.
In the new government, formed after the elec-
tions, Klement Gottwald became prime minister;
the two Czechoslovaks best known abroad
retained their former positions, Benesˇ as president
and Jan Masaryk as foreign minister. But soon the
communists inside and outside the government
started to behave high-handedly, and mass arrests
of their opponents were ordered. Clashes in
parliament and between government ministers
became increasingly heated and the supporters
of the democratic parties were considering
whether they would not have to resist violations
of justice if democracy was to survive. But to the
outside world the presence of Benesˇ and Masaryk
appeared to guarantee the preservation of civil
rights; that illusion was shattered early in 1948.
One of the major headaches for the Eastern
European communist leaders was the difficulty of
discovering what Stalin really wanted. At lower
levels, Russian advice and influence were at times