Victorious British armies had shared with the
Americans the reconquest of Italy, France and
Germany in arduous campaigns from the beach-
heads of Salerno and Normandy to the Elbe.
What the British now feared was that the
Americans would depart from Europe and simply
return to pre-war isolationism and so leave Britain
facing the Soviet Union alone.
The British people rejoiced on VE (victory in
Europe) Day and saw it as proving the powers of
endurance and the superiority of the British;
Churchill’s government knew better and recog-
nised the serious problems that lay ahead. The war
in Asia against Japan had still to be won. Hidden
from general public recognition were other facts:
the bleak position of Britain’s financial resources,
its foreign assets decimated by the purchase of war
supplies; the extent to which the US had provided
essential foods, raw materials and weapons under
the wartime ‘Lend-Lease’ arrangement which
meant postponing payment, not avoiding it alto-
gether. Without US help, the British economy –
geared until mid-1945 to the war effort – was not
able to provide the British people even with the
standard of living possible during the war. And
now in addition came the cost of maintaining the
minimum living standards of the former enemy in
the British zone of occupation. The food
imported into Germany had to be paid for by
Britain from its small dollar reserves.
If continental Western Europe was to be pre-
vented from sliding into chaos and protected
from Soviet expansion or subversion, the active
support of the US was essential. Yet there were
considerable and persisting Anglo-American dif-
ferences. In the US there was still a widespread
belief that Britain remained an unrepentant
imperialist power and a potentially formidable
trading rival. British policies in Palestine restrict-
ing Jewish immigration caused bitterness on both
sides of the Atlantic. Finally, despite his robust
language, President Harry S. Truman thought
that the US and the Soviet Union could reach an
accommodation and that it was Britain, bent on
defending its worldwide colonial interests, that
might provoke the Soviet Union into conflict.
Until the US was ready to recognise its new
responsibilities in regions of the world which it
had hitherto not regarded as falling within
spheres essential to its own security, Britain had
to fill the vacuum. Meanwhile, there was uncer-
tainty about America’s long-term commitment to
Western Europe, and about US readiness to
defend Western interests in Asia, the Middle East
and the Mediterranean. So, until March 1947, it
was Britain that financially as well as militarily
took up the burden of supporting the anti-
communist government in Greece.
With resources so overstretched, there was an
urgent need to limit Britain’s more costly respon-
sibilities. India had been promised its independ-
ence, and after the end of the war it could no
longer be delayed. The Labour government
grasped this nettle: Lord Mountbatten arrived inChapter 28
BRITAIN AND THE WORLD
A LEGACY TOO HEAVY TO BEAR