population growth and rapid industrialisation.
For close on half a century from 1866 to 1906
the occupations of the majority of the working
population altered only gradually. Whereas in
1866 half the working population was engaged in
agriculture, fisheries and forestry, by 1906 it was
still nearly 43 per cent. Employment in industry
during the same years scarcely changed at all,
from 29 per cent to 30.6 per cent. The tariff pro-
tected what was in the main a society of small pro-
ducers and sellers. In industry small workshops
employing less than five people predominated, as
did the old, established industrial enterprises of
clothing and textiles. But this is not the whole
picture. Productivity on the land and in industry
rose. New industries such as electricity, chemicals
and motor cars developed with considerable
success. France possessed large iron reserves in
French Lorraine which enabled it to become not
only an exporter in iron but also a steel producer.
Large works were built at Longwy on the
Luxembourg frontier, and the Le Creusot works
rivalled Krupps as armament manufacturers. Coal
mining in the Pas de Calais developed rapidly in
response, but France remained heavily dependent
on Britain and Germany for coal imports to cover
all its needs. Production figures show that France,
with a fairly stable population, was overtaken dra-
matically as an industrial nation by Germany,
whose population increased (see tables above).
For this reason France’s success in maintaining its
position in exports and production, judged per
head of population, can easily be overlooked.
In one respect – the provision of capital finance
for Europe – France won first place, and the large
proportion of its total investment overseas that
went to Russia between 1890 and 1914 became
a major factor in international relations.
The majority of the French people did not
wish to face the fact that new problems were
arising that required new solutions; they saw the
‘defence’ of the Republic in terms of combating
the political aims of the Church and the army.
But in the early twentieth century the growth and
concentration of industry and a new militancy
among groups of workers also threatened the
Republic from the left. The majority groups of
the parliamentary lower Chamber were deter-
mined to defeat these threats from the extreme
right or the left. Political power depended on the
management of the elected Chamber; govern-
ments came and went, but the legislation pre-
pared by the Chamber provided the necessary
continuity. Actual office was confined to a
number of leading politicians who reappeared in
ministry after ministry. In this scheme of things
few Frenchmen cared how many ministries were
formed. Their frequency, in itself, was a healthy
obstacle to too much government, for Frenchmen
had singularly little faith in their politicians.
There existed side by side with the elected gov-
ernment an administration with an ethos of its
own and which had little connection with the
democratic roots of government. This centralised
administration had been little modified through
all the constitutional change since its creation in
1800 by Napoleon. It made the head of state the
chief executive, while the prefects were the state’s
representatives and administrators in each of the
ninety geographical departments into which
France was divided. They were appointed, and
could be transferred or dismissed, by the Ministry
of the Interior.
The prefects dealt directly with each ministry
and on the whole kept aloof from politics; they
were hand-picked administrators who carried out
1
HEREDITARY FOES AND UNCERTAIN ALLIES 23
French and German coal, iron and steel production (annual averages)
1880–4 1900–4 1910–13
France Germany France Germany France Germany
Coal and lignite (million metric tons) 20.2 65.7 33.0 157.5 39.9 247.5
Pig iron (thousand metric tons) 1,518.0 2,893.0 2,665.0 7,926.0 4,664.0 14,829.0
Steel (million metric tons) 0.46 0.97 1.7 7.7 4.09 15.34
