emigrate to the US. Something of a special rela-
tionship had developed. China became the princi-
pal preoccupation of American missionaries, who
maintained an influential lobby in Washington. As
for American business relations with China, they
were as old as the American republic itself. Thus
China loomed large in America’s consciousness.
Truman continued Roosevelt’s policy of medi-
ation between the Nationalists and communists
but not on the basis of equality for both sides. The
Americans tried to persuade the communists to be
satisfied with a junior participating role in a
Nationalist Chinese government, subordinating
the communist army divisions to a Nationalist
supreme command. At the same time, despite the
corruption of Chiang’s rule and that of his party,
the Kuomintang, the US backed Chiang with
weapons and logistical support. In Washington it
was thought that civil war might still be avoided.
The true strength of the communists was under-
estimated in Washington during 1945 and 1946.
The Soviet Union, too, wished to prevent an open
conflict breaking out in China in 1945 and so was
ready to recognise and cooperate with the
Nationalist regime. Nevertheless, this did not
inhibit the Soviets, when they evacuated northern
China and Manchuria, from giving the local com-
munists assistance in the expectation that they
would take their place. The US meanwhile pro-
vided massive support for Chiang Kai-shek’s
forces. At the end of the war the Americans trans-
ported nearly half a million Nationalist troops by
air and sea to the north to put them in place in the
regions vacated by the Japanese before the com-
munists could get there. There was also a direct
military intervention by the US when 53,000
marines were landed to occupy key areas in north-
ern China. Confrontation in northern China
became inevitable as the Nationalists increasingly
clashed with communist forces, who had the
advantage of fighting close to their bases whereas
the Nationalists were hundreds of miles from
theirs.
From 1945 to 1949 the US shipped large
quantities of arms to China’s Nationalist forces to
help them gain control of the whole of China.
But, to begin with, US policy aims were fine
tuned. Chiang was not to receive so much mili-
tary support that he should feel confident about
discarding his American advisers and American
mediation efforts and so start an all-out civil war,
yet he was to be given sufficient arms to bring
Mao to the conference table. In this way the
Americans wished to induce the communists to
merge with Chiang’s government.
General George Marshall, America’s most dis-
tinguished soldier of the Second World War, was
sent out by Truman to mediate in January 1946.
He spent a fruitless year in China. He succeeded
in bringing Chiang and Mao Zedong to the
negotiating table, and to all appearances they
even came close to agreement. But appearances
hid the realities. Neither Chiang nor Mao was
ready to compromise his position; both sought
total control of China. Mao did not think
American hostility was inevitable; both leaders
wished to be able to persuade Washington that
the failure of mediation was due to the intransi-
gence of the other side.
Mao’s faith in ultimate victory was remarkable.
Although in 1945, 100 million Chinese lived
under Communist Party leadership, the commu-
nists were still numerically far weaker than the
Nationalists, whose army outnumbered theirs by
four to one. If it came to war, the US expected
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces to beat the
communists in the long run, but more damage
would be inflicted on China. The Americans
urged Chiang to reform the corrupt Kuomintang
regime and to make his government more accept-
able to the people of China. But in the summer of
1946 full-scale fighting broke out for control of
north-eastern China in the wake of the Soviet
withdrawal. Advice and military aid was showered
on Chiang but simultaneously the Americans dis-
engaged themselves from direct involvement. The
American marines were withdrawn, and the
Truman administration concluded that if Chiang’s
regime could not be saved by aid, the alternative
of a massive US military commitment in China
was simply out of the question. The rival Chinese
forces would have to be left to decide the fate of
China. This was a sensible view, showing that the
Truman administration had a sense of the limita-
tions of American power in the world. If at the
same time in Washington a more balanced view