was that the European countries should first reach
agreement among themselves on what they could
do and what help was needed from the US. The
US would not formulate a programme – that was
the business of the Europeans, from whom the
initiative must come:
The programme should be a joint one, agreed
to by a number of, if not all, European nations.
The role of this country should consist of
friendly aid in the drafting of a European
programme and of later support of such a pro-
gramme so far as it may be practical for us to
do so.
A week later, Marshall affirmed that the Soviet
Union was included in the offer.
The American chosen to run the show was Paul
Hoffman, president of the Studebaker automobile
corporation. But it was now up to the European
nations to respond. In London, Bevin recognised
at once the significance of the ideas set in motion
by Marshall’s speech; it meant not only the
involvement of the US in the economic recovery
of Western Europe, but American readiness to
participate in its defence against communism.
What mattered was to secure an immediate
favourable response from the French. On his own
initiative Bevin paid the French the compliment of
flying to Paris in June to consult Foreign Minister
Bidault and other members of his government.
The French insisted that the Russians should be
invited and be given an opportunity to join.
Molotov duly came to Paris on 27 June 1947
to join the Paris conference on the Marshall Plan.
Had he remained and dragged out the negotia-
tions, the chances of the US Congress voting large
sums to aid the Russians were nil. But Molotov
played no sophisticated game; he denounced the
Marshall Plan and forced the East European states
to boycott the offer. The Czechs, who had already
accepted an invitation to attend, were forced to
1
THE UNITED STATES 367
The reconstruction of western Europe. The conferment of an honourary degree on US Secretary of State
George Marshall provides the platform for a momentous speech, 5 June 1947. © Bettmann/Corbis
