Berlin, divided into four occupation zones,
had, at the end of the Second World War, been
placed under separate four-power control. Access
to Berlin was an obvious problem for the Western
powers; this was not overlooked in 1945, as has
often been asserted. The French, British and
American commanders in Berlin had reached an
agreement (29 June 1945) with the Soviet
command guaranteeing to them the use of one
main rail line, one main highway and two air cor-
ridors. Later, a second rail line and a third air
corridor were added. In January 1948, Soviet
inspectors began to board American and British
military trains demanding to check the papers of
the German passengers. That was just the begin-
ning; worse followed. Alleging technical difficul-
ties and the need for repairs, two rail links were
closed on 1 April and canal and road traffic was
also interrupted. But the escalation of pressure
did not deflect the Western states from their
course of action in Germany. A joint conference
held in London ended on 1 June with an agree-
ment to set up a West German state. There was,
therefore, no longer any reason to delay a separ-
ate currency reform in the West, thus ignoring the
Russian objections. Without sound currency there
could be no economic revival. By the end of June
the currency reforms for Western Germany were
carried out and, after further unsuccessful nego-
tiations with the Russians, introduced in the
Western sectors of Berlin too. The Russians now,
on 24 June, cut off all remaining land communi-
cations from the West by rail or road and three
weeks later all barge traffic as well. The blockade
of Berlin by land and canal was now complete.
The Soviet authorities justified the blockade by
claiming that the three Western Allies had broken
the four-power agreements on Germany; they
cited the Western currency reforms in particular
as being in breach of the agreement to treat
Germany as an economic whole. The Western
Allies protested and insisted on their rights of
access. The one route left to the beleaguered city
was by air – and the Russians had left the air cor-
ridors open, no doubt reluctant to launch an all-
out challenge. One can surmise their calculations.
The air corridors sufficed to supply the Allied gar-
risons and their dependants in the Western sectors
of Berlin. It must have seemed inconceivable that
2.25 million blockaded West Berliners could
receive supplies by air as well.
The blockade was intended as a ‘tails you lose,
heads we win’ gambit: the Allies would have to
give up either Berlin or their German policy. After
withdrawing they would be likely to pay more
attention to Soviet interests. All this would be
accomplished without real risk of war. The Allied
position in Berlin was militarily hopeless. Was
Western public opinion likely to start a third
world war over a German city and over the fate
of a people they had so recently done their best
to destroy? Western military experts did, in fact,
advise their governments that it was better to
negotiate and to withdraw with honour than to
be forced out a few weeks later. Even if the West
were ready for war over Berlin, from a military
point of view to fight a way through to the belea-
guered city was not sensible strategy. General
Lucius Clay’s proposal of sending an armed
convoy to Berlin was unrealistic.
The military ‘realities’ were, nevertheless,
ignored. President Truman and Bevin rejected
‘appeasement’. Despite Berlin, Allied plans for
transforming Bizonia (created by the fusion of the
British and American zones of occupation) into a
West German state went ahead. A German
Parliamentary Council convened in Bonn on 1
September 1948. Delegates from the eleven
separate Länderparliaments and from West Berlin
came to this historic assembly. The wily Konrad
Adenauer was elected president of the Council. In
May 1949 a Basic Law, a substitute constitution
for the Federal Republic of Germany, was agreed,
many differences and difficulties having been
overcome. To all appearances it was a constitu-
tion for an independent sovereign state. But
Britain, the US and France still reserved to them-
selves ultimate authority. West Germany was not
allowed to rearm, and the economy of the indus-
trial Ruhr, though not separated from West
Germany, was placed under inter-Allied control.
Germans were not yet trusted; the new demo-
cratic institutions remained in probationary tute-
lage to the three Western military governors,
renamed high commissioners. The new West
German state and constitution laid claim to rep-