would then assist the country under attack ‘by
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with
other parties, such action as it deems neces-
sary, including the use of armed force.. .’.
The measures would then be reported to the
UN Security Council and would cease when
the Security Council had taken the necessary step
to restore peace and security. The European part-
ners would have preferred an automatic military
commitment, but this was more than Dean
Acheson could deliver. The great majority of US
senators, both Republicans and Democrats, had
abandoned American isolation but not the con-
stitutional powers of the Senate. That had been
shown by the passage the previous year in June
1948 of Senator Arthur Vandenberg’s Senate res-
olution by an overwhelming majority; this had
advised that the US should develop ‘self-defense’,
‘regional and other collective arrangements’
within the UN Charter, with other nations in case
of an ‘armed attack’ threatening the security of
the US. The tortuous wording deliberately
avoided the word ‘alliance’. A significant addition
was that such associations should be governed by
‘constitutional process’, which in plain words
meant that the Senate would not abandon its
rights to decide by majority vote on issues of war
and peace. The resolution had paved the way for
the North Atlantic Treaty, which was duly ratified
by the Senate on 21 July 1949.
Not only the US but Canada also came to the aid
of Western Europe. During Britain’s dollar crisis
following the Second World War, Canada had
provided $1,250 million, a quarter of the total
loan to Britain, with the US supplying $3,750
million in 1945. Under the premiership of the
longest-serving prime minister in the Western
world (1921–5, 1926–30 and 1935–48), the
Liberal William L. Mackenzie King, Canada had
made a remarkable economic recovery from the
depression years of the 1930s and by the end of
the war had become a major world commercial
power. Its population sharply increased and immi-
gration from Europe helped to fill gaps created
by the sustained boom of the early 1950s and
1960s. American capital poured in and US–
Canadian economic cooperation was most strik-
ingly symbolised by the joint enterprise of the
transportation–electric-power development of the
deep-water route of the St Lawrence to the Great
Lakes.
With a combination of political skill and ruth-
lessness, Mackenzie King mastered the formidable
problems that faced any government in Canada:
the multi-party system, which often resulted in
government based on a minority of popular votes;
the problems inherent in managing Dominion
and provincial relationships; and the difficulty of
handling the anglophone and francophone rela-
tionship with Liberal Party strength solidly based
in Quebec. Mackenzie King’s cautious policies
fostered a Canadian sense of nationhood, empha-
sised the essential unity of the federal Dominion
and strengthened the supremacy of parliament
and central federal government as far as provincial
resistance would allow. The Liberals promoted
progressive legislation in social security and hous-
ing, though Mackenzie King’s own inclinations
were conservative.
That politics was the art of the possible was
Mackenzie King’s abiding principle. In external
affairs he reflected the isolationist attitude of the
majority of the Canadians in the 1930s. Although
Canada joined Britain in the war against Germany
on 10 September 1939, his government promised
that no conscription would be introduced. Never-
theless, Canadian volunteer forces distinguished
themselves during the war and suffered heavy
casualties on the Dieppe raid in 1942. They also
participated in the Italian campaign and the
Normandy landings. The conscription issue
deeply divided French- and English-speaking
Canada and cut across King’s natural political
base in Quebec. A plebiscite held in 1942 on the
1
1948: CRISIS IN EUROPE – PRAGUE AND BERLIN 375
Population (millions)
Canada US
1931 10.4 1930 123.1
1951 14.0 1950 154.3
1961 18.2 1960 180.6
1979 23.7 1978 218.0
1989 26.2 1990 249.6
2000 30.8 2000 283.2
