The assertiveness of France in the wider world
stands in remarkable contrast to the conservatism
of French society at home. The national humilia-
tion and defeat at German hands in the war of
1870–1 did not turn France in on itself, the grow-
ing disparity between French and German power
after 1870, whether looked at in terms of popula-
tion or industrial production, did not, as might be
expected, inhibit France’s efforts abroad.
The choice confronting France towards the
end of the nineteenth century was clear. A policy
of reconciliation and trust in imperial Germany
could have been followed. This would have been
based on the fact that Germany had not exploited
its superior strength for twenty-five years to foist
another ruinous war on France. Alternatively,
France could follow a deterrent policy. Unable
ever to be strong enough to match Germany
alone, it could with the help of an ally contain it
by making the chances of success for Germany in
war much more hazardous. This was the policy
generally followed by the governments of the
Third Republic after 1890. They first sought an
alliance with tsarist Russia and, after its conclu-
sion in 1894, made its maintenance the bedrock
of French foreign policy. The alliance made it
possible for France to continue to conduct policy
as a great power despite its relative inferiority in
population and production. Reliance on good
relations with Germany would have made it
dependent on Germany’s goodwill, a weaker and
in the end junior partner as long as relationships
were seen purely in terms of national power.
The path to the alliance with Russia was
smoothed by the large loans raised on the Paris
money market which Russia needed for its indus-
trial and military development. From close on
3,000 million francs in 1890, they rose to 12,400
million francs in 1914, representing between a
third and a quarter of the total of France’s foreign
investments.
The defensive military pacts concluded in 1892
and 1894 survived all the strains of the French–
Russian relationship down to 1914. The Russians
after all were not keen to risk a war with Germany
over France’s imperial ambitions and the French
did not want to become embroiled in war over
Russian Slav ambitions in the Balkans. At crucial
moments of tension support for each other was
half-hearted. Therefore, it made good sense to
reach settlements with Britain in Africa and, more
than that, offer support against Germany. That
became the basis of the Anglo-French entente
concluded in 1904, never an alliance but, never-
theless, an increasing British commitment over
the next ten years to assist France militarily if
threatened or attacked by Germany. Britain made
good its promises during the two Moroccan crises
of 1905 and 1911.
The year 1912 was also critical in French
history. Raymond Poincaré, a tough nationalist,
impeccable republican, orthodox anti-clerical and
conservative in social questions, became premier,
and subsequently president in 1913. Army appro-
priations were increased; even so in 1913 the
French army of 540,000 would be facing a
German army of 850,000 if war should break out- a catastrophic prospect. To reduce this gap a
bill lengthening service in the French army from
two to three years became law in 1913. The
French Chamber had turned away from the left
Socialists, and the army became more respectable
in the eyes of the leading politicians in power, as
it had proved a valuable and reliable instrument
in crushing strikes and revolutionary syndicalism.
Poincaré was determined that France should
never find itself at the mercy of Germany. A
strong alliance with Russia became the most cher-
ished objective of his diplomacy. So he reversed
earlier French policy and assured the Russians in
1912 that they could count on French support if
their Balkan policy led to conflict with Austria-
Hungary; if Germany then supported its ally,
France would come to the aid of Russia. This was
a most significant new interpretation and exten-
sion of the original Franco-Russian alliance of
1894; it ceased to be wholly defensive. Poincaré
also encouraged the Russians to reach naval
agreements with the British.
Against the growing power of Germany,
Poincaré saw that France was faced with a grim
choice: either to abandon its status as a great
power and to give in to German demands (the
manner of their presentation had been amply
demonstrated during the Moroccan crisis of
- or to strengthen its own forces and draw as