thoughts of true independence. They left the tra-
ditional social structure and simply sought to
work through it as the Dutch had done. All the
same, there were now new opportunities for the
Indonesian national leadership who, the Japanese
judged, could serve a useful role in mobilising
Indonesians for the Japanese war effort. All that
really mattered to the Japanese was to exploit the
human and material resources of the islands. They
forced the various national factions to patch up
their differences and sent the Indonesian national
leaders out to penetrate the far-flung regions of
the archipelago. Since they did not regard the
Dutch as their rightful masters and friends, these
leaders had no qualms about collaborating with
the Japanese. They also established links with the
anti-Japanese underground movement. Their
dream was Indonesian independence, and to
achieve it the question of whether to work with
or against outside powers, be they Dutch or
Japanese, was a matter of tactics, not of loyalty to
foreign rulers. Thus Sukarno had no hesitation in
enjoying good relations with the Japanese military
commander of Java, given their mutual interests
and the reality of Japan’s supreme power. Later,
with the deterioration of their military prospects,
the Japanese found it expedient to make conces-
sions to Indonesian national feelings and to
promise independence. Except briefly in Java in
May 1945, and then only in outward appearance,
it was nowhere achieved under Japanese rule,
which collapsed too quickly for the changes of
policy to take effect.
The Dutch and Japanese having been defeated
in turn, at last it seemed that Indonesian inde-
pendence would be achieved peacefully. Sukarno
and Hatta nevertheless knew that they faced seri-
ous internal and external obstacles. Within the
country, although the communists had not been
able effectively to reorganise themselves after their
suppression by the Dutch, a new, youthful genera-
tion of radical leaders working for social revolution
had emerged during the Second World War. More
seriously still, British and Indian troops under
Mountbatten’s supreme command landed in
Indonesia in September 1945, not merely to dis-
arm the Japanese but, as it soon turned out, to
restore Indonesia to Dutch rule. The Indonesians
had, however, made good use of the hiatus
between the Japanese surrender and the arrival of
Allied troops. In August, that is a month before
the British landed, a constitution was agreed and
an independent Indonesian republic proclaimed.
A sizeable armed militia of Indonesians, largely
trained by the Japanese, whose arms they com-
mandeered, controlled Java and were ready to
defend the republic. Nevertheless, after the British
landings Sukarno decided not to resist by force and
allowed the British to occupy Jakarta, the capital.
But Sukarno’s and Hatto’s authority was not suffi-
cient to prevent the development of Indonesian
resistance and in October 1945, despite their
efforts, the armed struggle became fiercer. In
November the British general in command of the
occupying force was killed by an Indonesian sniper
and full-scale fighting broke out, culminating in a
battle at Surabaya. No match for the British troops,
some 15,000 Indonesians died in that tragic
encounter. Bloodshed sanctified Indonesian
nationalism, and the battle of Surabaya is cele-
brated as Heroes Day in Indonesia.
Struggling to recover from the effects of the
Second World War in Europe, successive Dutch
governments tenaciously attempted to resume
their colonial rule in south-east Asia. With British
help, Dutch troops despatched from Europe were
able to establish dominance over the principal
cities, but the vast countryside was another
matter. The suppression of Indonesian national-
ism required far larger resources than the
Netherlands could hope to command. Nor was
international opinion in the United Nations or in
Washington sympathetic to the Dutch. The prag-
matic British saw the Dutch struggle as wasteful
and ineffective and, after the failure of initial
attempts at pacification, concluded that the
Dutch should take the same road as the British
were travelling in India and Burma. More and
more isolated, the Dutch hung on. Indonesia was
of immense value with its oil and rubber, but the
Dutch found themselves in a no-win position
against the fifth most populated nation in the
world, the majority of whose citizens wished
to get rid of the white colonial rulers. The
Indonesians were not strong enough to force the
Dutch army out, so Indonesian nationalists were