forced into a series of compromises and trials of
strength. The British government was glad to take
advantage of a truce in November 1946 to with-
draw completely and leave the islands to the
Indonesians and the Dutch.
The Indonesian nationalists, despite making
agreements with the Dutch authorities, did all
they could to frustrate them. In 1947 the Dutch
tried, as before the war, to crush nationalist oppo-
sition by a so-called police action. In 1948 they
stepped up their military effort and attempted to
impose a federal solution which denied Indonesia
sovereignty, but the Indonesian political leaders
simply would not cooperate with the Dutch. The
Netherlands was therefore faced with an unend-
ing military commitment in Indonesia which it
could not afford. Asian nationalism overcame mil-
itary and economic superiority by sheer attrition
in Indonesia, as later it did elsewhere in south-
east Asia. Crucial too were US threats to cut off
reconstruction aid if diverted to the war in
Indonesia. The Dutch bowed to the inevitable.
In December 1949 the Dutch conceded inde-
pendence to Indonesia and in August the follow-
ing year 85,000 Dutch troops and the colonial
administration withdrew. With them went several
thousand Indonesians who preferred to make the
Netherlands their home and as a result turned the
homogeneous Dutch into a multiracial society.
But 1950 did not mark the end of conflict
between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The
Netherlands held on to Western New Guinea,
which the Indonesians claimed, and it still hoped
for some constitutional arrangement linking
Indonesia and the Netherlands for another
decade. A unitary Indonesian republic was not
established until 1960, and not until two years
later did the Dutch agree to hand over Western
New Guinea (or West Irian, as the Indonesians
called it). Decolonisation thus proved a painful
and long-drawn-out process, damaging both to
the Indonesians and to the Dutch. How recently
European physical control of colonial empires was
abandoned needs to be borne in mind, for the
speed with which the bitterness abated between
the former colonial subjects and the European
nations is one of the most remarkable and sur-
prising aspects of twentieth-century history.
The French, as empire builders in south-east Asia,
were – like the Americans – late arrivals, conquer-
ing Indo-China in the mid-nineteenth century.
They superimposed French rule on an ancient
Vietnamese culture with a sense of national unity
that did not diminish during the century of
French occupation. The Vietnamese were brought
by the French under one imperial umbrella with
the Laotians and Cambodians to form the entity
of French Indo-China. As elsewhere in the colo-
nial world the amalgamation of Western ideas and
the indigenous culture brought about rapid
changes and created divided loyalties. The better-
off, the landlords, the independent farmers and
the traders, resisted far-reaching social change
and, to this extent, identified themselves with the
French administration. French education also
nourished an intelligentsia, many of whom were
inspired by Marxist ideals and committed them-
selves to an anti-colonial struggle.
The French took their civilising white man’s
mission seriously in the south of Vietnam (Cochin
China), which they administered directly; central
Vietnam was less affected; in the north, around
Hanoi, some basic industrial development took
place. The French built railways and roads, a uni-
versity in Hanoi, schools and hospitals; they
increased literacy and stamped out widespread
diseases; mortality rates fell. There was less racial
arrogance than in British colonies, and a greater
promotion of education. Contact with France was
also encouraged, and a small Vietnamese elite
travelled there in the 1930s, including Ho Chi-
minh. On the debit side, economic development
in Indo-China was dictated by the interests of
metropolitan France. Industrialisation was slow.
Over-population in the two most fertile regions,
the Mekong River in the south and the Red River
in the north, was a perennial problem. The great
majority of the 16 million Vietnamese were poor
peasants, hardest hit by the collection of rents and
taxes. The depression of the 1930s, which saw
steep declines in the price of rice and sugar, most
affected those who could least afford it and led to
waves of unrest. All peasant and student protest
was met by the French with repression.
A small Vietnamese Communist Party inspired
by the Russian Revolution had been formed in
1
THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 385
