of the two Vietnam regimes towards each other,
they would never take place. The French were sat-
isfied at having found a way out of the quagmire.
The British could bask in the role of peacemakers
on the world stage. But the Americans were hos-
tile, rightly sceptical about communist promises,
and warned against a resumption of fighting from
the north. But they too had compromised in
accepting a frontier drawn, not on the borders of
China, but dividing Vietnam at the 17th parallel.
Even so it seemed that another Korean situation
had been created, with a clearly defined territorial
limit on the extent of communist power.
That, however, proved an illusion. The two
Vietnams were more realistic: the struggle for unity
was not over. Both sides would have to prepare for
it, Ho Chi-minh in the north, but who in the
south? Bao Dai was too weak now that his French
protectors had departed. The Americans wanted
someone tougher and more single-minded. They
backed Ngo Dinh Diem, a nationalist and member
of a leading Catholic family, who had already
proved his patriotic credentials when opposing
French interference in the 1930s. He had travelled,
living in France and then ascetically in a Catholic
seminary in the US. In 1954 Bao Dai recalled him
and made him prime minister. In 1955 he ousted
Bao Dai and, in a rigged referendum, established
the Vietnam Republic with himself as president.
An implacable enemy of communism, autocratic
and corrupt, Diem refused to accept the Geneva
settlement as final. South Vietnam had not signed
anything beyond a ceasefire. Ho Chi-minh too was
biding his time before renewing the struggle for
the unity of Vietnam under Marxist rule. Peace did
not have a chance.
1
THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 389
