had thrown in his lot with Germany and Japan,
Subhas Chandra Bose, attempted to win recruits,
the majority of Indian prisoners preferred to share
the appalling hardships with their British com-
rades, rather than gain their liberty and tolerable
living conditions by reneging. It is remarkable evi-
dence of the loyalty and pride that ordinary
Indians felt for their regiment and flag. The Indian
nationalist politicians reacted differently and saw
an opportunity to push forward independence at a
time when the British Empire was hard pressed.
Congress leaders had come to the conclusion
that the moment was ripe to force the British Raj
to give up its control of India, but they had no
intention of exchanging their British overlords for
Japanese conquerors. If Japan attacked from
Burma, Congress leaders would organise the
resistance of free India with its allies in the United
Nations military coalition, including of course the
Commonwealth. The Japanese in Burma were
checked and remained on the defensive until
- Gandhi and Nehru and Congress were
anxious to prevent a British transfer of power
which would allow the conservative princes and
the Muslim League separate powers. This would,
they believed, only lead to a feudal, federal India
in which religious fanaticism would open the way
to communal strife and violence. Jinnah had
already declared that the aim of the Muslim
League was an independent Pakistan. The princes
would attempt to hang on to their power and so
frustrate Nehru’s and Gandhi’s vision of an India
united, a progressive India socially reformed,
caste discrimination gone, a secular India striving
for religious harmony, a democratic India accept-
ing elected representative forms of government.
With Japan at the gates, the British were deeply
worried that Indian loyalty could not be counted
on. In the spring of 1942 Sir Stafford Cripps was
sent to offer India independence after the war was
over, but to appease Islamic aspirations the
Muslims would be given the option of secession if
they wished. This condition made certain the
rejection of the offer by the Congress leadership,
who would in turn have had to promise support
for the war. The Congress leaders were not to be
cajoled into a government powerless under the
viceroy, thus indicating that they accepted imper-
ial rule. For Congress another vital objection was
that acceptance would encourage the Muslims
after the war to divide India and set up their own
state. They suspected that Britain wished to divide
and rule. The British appeared to be more con-
cerned with retaining the loyalty of the Muslims
during the war. In August 1942 Congress launch-
ed the ‘Quit India’ campaign. The viceroy then
put an end to all debate. He decided that the
only safe thing to do was to intern the political
leaders of the Congress Party, including Gandhi,
to prevent them from continuing to spread disaf-
fection throughout India. The silencing of the
Congress politicians enabled Jinnah’s Muslim
League greatly to strengthen its position. The
momentum for the partition of India and the cre-
ation of Pakistan was henceforth not to be halted.
By August 1945 with the defeat of both
Germany and Japan, the curtain was about to fall
on the final act. Churchill, who was reluctant to
‘scuttle’ out of empire, had been replaced by
Attlee and a Labour government. Labour shared
none of Churchill’s historical sentimentality. The
viceroy, Viscount Wavell, was soon to discover
this. During 1943 and 1944 his hands had been
tied by London, who were afraid that talks with
Indian nationalists would sow disaffection. At this
very time, masked by government suppression of
news, the worst human disaster to befall India in
the twentieth century occurred. The Bengal
Famine claimed 3 million victims. There was
bureaucratic mismanagement, a failure to trans-
port food hoarded to feed the army; Burmese
supplies were cut. This disaster further fuelled
demands for independence.
In 1946, Field Marshal Lord Wavell told
London either to strengthen the army to keep
peace until all Indian parties had agreed to an
independent government of India in which they
would share power, or for Britain to withdraw
from India province by province, disclaiming
responsibility for the bloody consequences of
communal strife which was bound to follow its
departure. This was truly Hobson’s choice. What
had led the viceroy to such bleak conclusions?
Wavell’s attempts to arrive at compromises
among Indian political leaders promised no early
success, especially after the breakdown of talks