Their ostensible task was merely to disarm the
Japanese and occupy the country north of the
38th parallel. Under Soviet auspices the Korean
People’s Republic was proclaimed on 6 September
- To avoid a power vacuum in the south,
meanwhile, the US ordered the Japanese military
command to maintain authority until US forces
arrived, which they did on 8 September. The
Americans were in fact doing exactly what
the British had done in French Indo-China. The
Korean People’s Republic was opposed by the
exiled Korean provisional government, which had
been supported by the US and by Kuomintang
China. With the Russians north of the 38th paral-
lel and the Americans to the south, the partition
was supposed to be temporary. The stark fact was
that the Korean people north and south were not
to be given the complete democratic choice over
the future of their country that they had been
promised. More than half a century later Korea
remains divided still.
There were parallels with occupied and divided
Germany. In both Korea and Germany the military
zonal frontiers became the frontiers of separate
states. In both Germany and Korea, the Russians
hoped that by building up a strong communist
embryonic government they could attract the
larger population in the rest of the country by pur-
suing popular-front tactics with the left dominat-
ing. The Americans in Korea were also following
popular-front tactics, so to speak in reverse, in try-
ing to bring together a coalition of the right, the
moderates and the left under right-wing predom-
inance. This coalition General John Hodge, the
commanding US general in South Korea, hoped
would attract the moderates of the North. The
Soviet andAmerican strategies therefore involved
building a sound pro-Soviet or pro-Western polit-
ical base in each of their zones prior to unifying
Korea, which could then be expected to conform
to their views. The Koreans, in the more populous
South, proved not to be so amenable.
In the American-occupied South the rightist
Dr Syngman Rhee emerged as the dominant
Korean politician. He was not only violently anti-
communist but also an ardent nationalist deter-
mined on the reality of an independent unified
Korea. A tough and formidable leader, he had
spent most of his adult life from 1912 to 1945 in
exile in the US championing Korean independ-
ence. Now with Japan defeated, Rhee was in a
hurry to get the Russians and the Americans out
of his country and to defeat, if necessary by force,
the communists in the North. He was suspicious
of the bargaining of the Russians and the
Americans over the future of Korea. Despite their
concern over Rhee’s extremism the Americans
could not do without him since he clearly domin-
ated the weaker moderate and left political group-
ings in the South.
In North Korea Russian aid between 1945 and
1950 built up a militarily powerful state which the
military weaker South could not hope to overrun.
Strong guerrilla activity might then destabilise
South Korea, and the partitioned country would
be plunged into civil war, which the better pre-
pared North would be expected to win. But Stalin
took care to avoid any overt direct Russian
involvement. Kim Il Sung, the autocratic, inde-
pendent communist leader, was imposing his own
brand of Marxist society on the Korean people;
his thoughts were to have equal validity with
those of Mao and Lenin. He was no mere puppet.
Having built up the North the Russians withdrew
in December 1948, leaving behind military advis-
ers. This placed increasing pressure on the
Americans to leave the South.
The Americans were eager enough to with-
draw. The South had become a bed of nettles.
But how to extricate themselves? When the US
military advisers looked at the strategic situation
they concluded that South Korea was not a suit-
able base for the defence of Western Pacific inter-
ests. Japan and the Pacific islands, including the
Philippines, formed the best defensive arc. A
divided Korea, with the south looking to the
West, was a perfectly acceptable solution. But
there was the commitment to a unified Korea.
The Russians and Chinese were willing to see a
unified communist Korea come into being, the
Americans a unified pro-Western, anti-communist
Korea. No wonder the Russians and Americans
could never agree at their joint meetings as
trustees. Completely free elections throughout
Korea would have put the communists into a
minority, especially with the rightist South