Koreans rigging the elections. So the Russians
resisted that. Meanwhile in the part of the
country under its control the American military
government was being assailed on all sides to
hand over to South Korean politicians. The
Americans, at a time when they were champi-
oning the free world against communism, found
the authoritarian Rhee an embarrassing ally.
This intractable problem was handed to the
United Nations at the end of 1947. The UN was
Western-dominated, so this involved no complete
abandonment of South Korea. The UN was sup-
posed to organise elections throughout Korea
preparatory to unifying the country, but this was
obviously a pipe dream. No elections could be
held in 1948 in the North, and in the South they
were sufficiently corrupt with thousands of arrests
to raise doubts whether the UN could accept the
election as valid. The UN nevertheless did so and
Syngman Rhee became the first president of the
Republic of Korea, claiming to speak for all
Korea. He was promptly recognised by the
West. In June 1949 the Americans followed the
Russians in pulling their troops out. In the North,
the Democratic People’s Republic under Kim Il
Sung was recognised by China, the Soviet Union
and the communist satellites. With the Russians
and Americans no longer in direct control, civil
war had come a step closer. The sparring, mainly
verbal, continued until the summer of 1950.
Between 1948 and 1950 the East–West
balance in Asia was radically altered. Communism
in various national forms was spreading fast over
the mainland. At the same time from 1948 to
1949 in Germany the US and Britain were facing
down the Russians over Berlin. The Russians and
Americans each exercised sufficient restraint to
avoid escalation into war. Similar restraint was
shown by the Americans, the Russians and the
Chinese during the climax of the crisis in Asia
from 1949 to 1950. Attention had focused on
China before June 1950 rather than on Korea.
American efforts on the Asian mainland had been
limited, ambiguous and largely unsuccessful.
Chiang Kai-shek had collapsed with his corrupt
regime in China and the Americans had refused
to make an all-out effort to save him; US help to
the French in Indo-China had also been limited.
American troops were not engaged in fighting
anywhere, and it was to be hoped that the with-
drawal of the Russians and Americans had reduced
East–West tensions on the Asian mainland too.
The Truman administration had to decide early in
1950 what constituted the free world in Asia, how
it could be defended and how, above all, any mis-
understanding had to be avoided that could turn
the Cold War into a ‘hot war’. The communists in
China and the Soviet Union had to learn which
vital Western interests the Americans would defend
with their military might. An era of post-war
uncertainty would then be ended. For both the
Russians and the Americans the priority was
Europe, where no further alterations in spheres of
power and interest would be tolerated: there the
frontiers were firmly set. Asia was too vast for
America or Russia to control. The transformation
from empire to independence, the rapid changes
taking place in many societies and internal conflicts
were all creating uncertainties about the future in a
manner that was bad news for the West, which was
identified with imperialism. In this respect, the
West was at a disadvantage in the face of the ‘lib-
erating’ claims of the various communist and
socialist movements. The future of much of south-
east Asia still seemed to hang in the balance,
American resources were not limitless, and
Western Europe was still in a perilous condition.
At least the Americans controlled the prize of
Japan. The Truman administration’s military advis-
ers were reasonably consistent from 1947 to the
summer of 1950: in eastern Asia the line of defence
that could be, and would have to be, defended lay
in the Pacific short of the Asian mainland.
Truman, more concerned with Europe, ac-
cepted their advice. But on one significant point
he adopted the views of Secretary of State
Dean Acheson rather than those of the chiefs of
staff. Acheson thought that the Chinese commu-
nists could be encouraged to follow a line inde-
pendent of Moscow’s. They should therefore be
conciliated now that Mao had proclaimed the
Chinese People’s Republic in October 1949. The
sore point was the island of Taiwan (Formosa), to
which Chiang Kai-shek had withdrawn with close
on half a million still loyal troops. Although Mao
1
1950: CRISIS IN ASIA – WAR IN KOREA 407
