Morocco. Nationalist demonstrations and, all the
more so, rebellions were harshly suppressed.
Complete military control was the prior condition
of France’s civilising mission. In the aftermath of
a serious Muslim revolt in Syria in 1925–6, the
French decided it was expedient to grant more
autonomy and proclaimed a Syrian republic in
1930 with a parliamentary constitution. Whereas
Britain fostered Arab ‘monarchies’, the French
promoted ‘republics’. In 1936 a French–Syrian
treaty, following the British example in Iraq,
sought to lay the basis of a partnership between
Syria and France in place of outright French
domination. Arab nationalism in Syria was not
satisfied. The French military and bureaucracy
maintained close supervisory control, their pres-
ence making it evident who the real rulers were.
In the Lebanon, the French faced less opposi-
tion, and the constitution which they imposed
sought carefully to distribute the offices and rep-
resentation among the principal groups of inhab-
itants. But nationalist opposition to the French
occupation developed among both the Christian
Maronites and the Muslims. France’s domination
of the Levant became a vital symbol of its con-
tinued role as a great power.
France took its cultural mission seriously and
made sacrifices for it. Money and teachers were
poured in to provide French education; hospitals
were built and French judicial codes introduced.
Communications improved, Beirut turned into
one of the Middle East’s best harbours, modern
cities with fine public buildings and adequate util-
ities transformed the Ottoman towns and, most
important of all, a genuine effort was made to
improve the lot of the peasant, with impressive
increases in agricultural productivity. France thus
made a real and genuine contribution to the well-
being of the peoples of Syria and the Lebanon.
In Syria and the Lebanon in 1940, as well as
North Africa, however, the French administration
and army remained loyal to the government of
Vichy France, and obeyed its orders. Although
the generals on the spot wanted to fight on, sus-
picion of Britain’s intentions also remained
strong. As long as Syria and the Lebanon did not
become an enemy base, Britain, beset by enough
difficulties already, was prepared to leave Vichy
undisturbed in the Levant. But the Syrians,
impressed by the German victories, became
increasingly pro-Nazi. Syria was the key. The
Germans arranged to send military supplies to
Iraq by way of neighbouring Vichy Syria. Vichy
agreed to cooperate in return for substantial
German concessions in France. The Vichy gov-
ernment also agreed to defend Syria against a
British attack. So German planes landed on Syrian
airfields with supplies for Iraq; but the effort was
in vain. Churchill acted ruthlessly. If necessary the
British would fight their former allies. Iraq as has
been seen was occupied before German supplies
could get through and then, in June 1941,
Britain, together with the Free French forces,
invaded Syria and the Lebanon.
The Syrian and Lebanese campaigns signified
a deep humiliation for France. The bulk of the
French forces had refused to join the Free French
troops and, though they capitulated, had been
allowed to return to Vichy France. Despite the
ceremonial return of Syria and the Lebanon to
Free France, it was the British who were the clear
masters of the situation. Capitalising on this,
Britain demanded that the Free French proclaim,
in order to appeal to Arab opinion throughout
the Middle East, that the Lebanon and Syria
would be free. De Gaulle had no choice but to
comply. Deeply resentful, he accused Britain of
driving France out of the Levant.
De Gaulle in 1945 was more concerned to re-
establish French authority. In May he ordered
military action and a number of Syrian towns
were shelled and bombed. But this was not 1920.
Britain was in a position both of overwhelming
military might and of decisive political influence
in Europe and the Middle East. Supported by the
US, Britain forced the French out. It was a humil-
iating end to French rule, and de Gaulle neither
forgot nor forgave.The French were able to take comfort two years
later when British rule in Palestine came to an end.
Although Britain’s Balfour Declaration had pow-
erfully contributed to the creation of the State of
Israel, there were in 1945 many Jews who no
longer saw in Britain a benevolent friend. British
policies had not won Arab friendship either.