Hungary. Eisenhower made it clear that the US
would not back France and Britain. At home
Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the Labour Party,
warned Eden on 31 October that his party would
not support the government in warlike actions
against Egypt. Gaitskell received no answer when
he demanded to know if Britain was at war. By
the morning of the 31st, the ultimatum had
expired but no shot had been fired by Britain or
France. The Security Council was in session in
New York that day. In Cairo, Nasser had not pan-
icked, but was getting ready to defend Egypt
from the threatened Anglo-French assault. The
British ambassador was still unmolested, occupy-
ing the Embassy in Cairo; to preserve secrecy he
had not been recalled; nor were the British and
French civilian employees of the Suez Canal
Company evacuated in time – this put many civil-
ian lives at risk. Then during the evening of 31
October RAF Canberras and Valiants started
bombing Egyptian airfields. The Egyptian air
force was grounded throughout the Suez War,
thus removing Israel’s principal concern.
The attack on Egypt in breach of the UN
Charter deeply divided the British people. In the
House of Commons the Conservative majority
ensured the defeat of a motion of censure tabled
by the Labour Party, and much popular opinion
welcomed Britain’s standing up to Nasser,
though the more thoughtful condemned the
aggression. But there was no doubt where the US
stood. Dulles nevertheless attempted to help
Britain by delaying United Nations action. France
and Britain were able, by using their veto power,
to stymie the Security Council, but they could
not prevent the General Assembly from acting
under the United for Peace Resolution invoked
six years earlier when the Korean War broke out.
Even so, the interval between the air attack on
Egypt on 31 October and the actual main land-
ings of troops brought by sea was too long. On
3 November, unhappily for Britain, Dulles – who
was trying to limit the damage – entered hospital
for a cancer operation that put him out of action.
On 4 November the General Assembly called on
the secretary-general to arrange a ceasefire.
The pressure on the three belligerents was now
considerable. The Israelis promised to comply if
the Egyptians also agreed to a ceasefire. Nasser,
though, was naturally not intimidated, given the
worldwide condemnation of Britain and France.
He was ready to carry on a guerrilla struggle if
Britain and France occupied the Canal Zone.
Meanwhile differences were also opening up
between Britain and France on how best to carry
on military operations. After the UN ceasefire res-
olution, Eden was determined that the invasion
should take place even though he had accepted
‘in principle’ a UN peacekeeping force to take
over from the British and French. The creation of
a peacekeeping force was approved by the UN on
4 November; a day later French and British para-
troops landed in the Canal Zone. The main
landing from the sea followed on the 6th. The
Anglo-French troops needed only three more
days to advance south from Port Said and to com-
plete the occupation of the Canal Zone. But
politically time had run out.
The Soviet Union issued nuclear threats while
engaged in bloody repression of the Hungarian
rising. But US pressure on Israel, plus the capture
of Sharm al-Sheikh, decided the Israelis to stop
fighting. How could Britain and France now
credibly continue, given that they had claimed
that the purpose of the military action was to keep
Egypt and Israel apart? The French were ready to
defy the UN for a little longer, but Eden saw
no alternative to accepting the ceasefire on 6
November. Harold Macmillan, the chancellor of
the exchequer, forecast a financial catastrophe as
foreigners were depleting their sterling holdings
and the US was refusing to help. There would
anyway be the additional costs of bringing in oil
now that the Egyptians had blocked the Canal by
scuttling fifty ships.
What had been achieved? Eden’s reputation for
statesmanship had been tarnished just as ill health
forced him to rest. He left for Jamaica on 23
November, but it was the prelude to his retire-
ment in January 1957, a sad end to a long and
distinguished career. UN troops began arriving in
Port Said in late November 1956. Anglo-
American relations reached their lowest ebb that
autumn with the re-elected Eisenhower adminis-
tration refusing either to ship oil from the Gulf
1
1956: CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST – SUEZ 451
