intelligence at the same time detected evidence of
Soviet military preparations. Kissinger responded
with a tough rejection, and US forces around the
world were placed on intermediate war alert. But
on 25 October Kissinger sent an olive branch: if
Brezhnev abandoned the idea of unilateral action,
there would be no need for a confrontation at all.
Brezhnev climbed down and that same day joined
with the US in sponsoring another United Nations
ceasefire resolution setting up a UN peacekeeping
force that would exclude both US and Soviet con-
tingents. In return the US ensured that this time
the Israelis would stop all hostilities. The Third
Egyptian Army was thus rescued, and Egypt and
Syria saved from further humiliation.
The 1973 war was no walk-over for Israel. This
time its losses in men and material were heavy:
5,500 dead and wounded and 800 tanks des-
troyed. Egypt’s and Syria’s losses were greater in
absolute terms but not in proportion to their
larger populations. Yet out of the Yom Kippur
War developed positive consequences. Egypt and
Syria had to accept realistically that they could not
hope to inflict a total defeat on Israel, but their
early successes had restored Arab pride. For the
Israelis a state of no peace imposed harsh burdens
and grave risks. They were now more prepared to
return Arab territory if they could thereby obtain
peace. For the Americans, the Arab–Israeli con-
flict seemed only to provide opportunities for
Soviet intrusion in the Middle East. From this
matrix of interests, US diplomacy succeeded –
with the signature of the Camp David Accords in
September 1978 – in bringing Egypt and Israel
together to agree a peace treaty. It is the corner-
stone on which a comprehensive peace still awaits
to be built a quarter of a century later.
Amid the turmoil of inter-Arab conflicts and the
Arab–Israeli tensions and wars, of Soviet interven-
tions in the Middle East and Iraq’s anti-Western
policies, the West had one powerful, oil-rich and
secure ally in Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran.
Until Islamic Iran forced itself into the news
in the 1980s, the peoples of the Western world
had only the haziest notions about the country
and its people. Iran lies between the Caspian Sea
and the Persian Gulf, and has borders with no less
than five countries: to the north the Soviet
Union, to the west Turkey and Iraq and to the
east Afghanistan and Pakistan. It occupies the
eastern shore of the Persian Gulf; on the north-
ern shore Iraq has an outlet along the estuary
Shatt al-Arab; from the north down the western
shore lies the oil-rich sheikhdom of Kuwait, the
kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the sheikhdoms of
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and
Oman. It is oil that gives this region its signifi-
cance, supplying much of the needs of Western
Europe and Japan, with additional exports to the
US, the Middle East and Africa. A glance at a map
reveals Iran’s and Iraq’s key positions. Iran is a
vast country of 627,000 square miles, five times
the land area of Britain, though half of it is desert.
In the Middle East (not counting Pakistan or
Turkey) only Egypt has as large a population.
Given Iran’s size, its oil resources and popula-
tion, the heritage of an ancient civilisation and the
history of a once great Persian Empire, its rulers
might understandably dream of making their
country a great power once more. But Iran
(known as Persia until it was renamed in 1935)
had first to free itself from foreign domination.
The oil and Iran’s strategic position on the path
to India had encouraged Britain to dominate
southern Persia and the Gulf, agreeing to a divi-
sion of interests that left Russia dominant in the
north. Never genuinely independent, the country
was occupied once more in 1941 by British and
Russian troops for fear that the Shah would throw
in his lot with the Germans. He was forced to
abdicate and his son succeeded him.
During the post-war years the nationalist
movement led by Mossadeq tried to win true
independence and to loosen the control of the
British oil giants over the country’s main
resource. The British government resisted and
there was new turmoil, which was brought to an
end in 1953 with the help once more of foreign
intervention. The Americans and British helped
the Shah to oust Mossadeq and the nationalist
politicians and to stage a coup. In the eyes of the
nationalists the Shah now owed his authority to
foreign intervention, thus further diminishing
Iran’s sovereignty and independence. In 1955
Iran joined the Western alliance – the Baghdad