All these repressive measures failed to break
the religious feelings of the majority of Poles.
Farmers clung to their soil and workers could not
be persuaded to build up a socialist Poland which
offered them so little reward. The bureaucracy,
the secret police and the party were ‘them’, to be
suffered only as long as was necessary – and that
meant, as Poles realised, as long as Soviet military
force held Poland in its grip.
Stalin’s death did not lead to any immediate
thaw in Poland. Bierut held on to power, though
on Moscow’s insistence ‘collective’ leadership had
to be adopted by splitting the positions of party
secretary and premier. Soon a split developed, as
it had in Moscow, between the Stalinist hardlin-
ers and the reformers, and Bierut was forced into
concessions. Beria’s fall in the Soviet Union had
downgraded in the Soviet Union the previously
all-powerful security apparatus and limited its
murderous activities. Poland’s regime had to
follow suit. Communists unjustly imprisoned
were rehabilitated and Gomulka was quietly
released from prison. Discussion became more
free and critical; even Western jazz could now be
played. The Stalinist years had proved to be no
more than a cloak as far as people’s minds were
concerned: a religious, patriotic and critical pop-
ulation remained very much alive in town and
country and so showed up the isolation of the
Polish communist leadership. Khrushchev’s not
so secret speech to the Twentieth Congress of the
Communist Party in February 1956 denouncing
Stalin was a heavy blow to Bierut and the hard-
liners in Poland. Indeed, it may have contributed
to the heart attack and death of Bierut in Moscow
a few weeks later.
Edward Ochab, formerly a Stalinist, now with
the wind of change from Moscow a more flexible
communist, succeeded as party secretary. He had
turned reformer. Khrushchev’s speech was read
out at Communist Party meetings throughout
Poland; a general amnesty released many political
prisoners. Reforms eased the lot of farmers and
workers, but the firm control of the party made
people regard talk of ‘democratisation’ with cyn-
icism, and the Russians remained ever present.
Yet, three years after Stalin’s death popular pres-
sure from below intensified in Eastern Europe,
fuelled rather than appeased by half-hearted
reforms, as it turned into open risings in Hungary
in November 1956. But the most serious crisis
appeared first to be occurring in Poland, when in
June 1956 the Poznan steelworkers escalated a
pay dispute into a disturbance of much wider
significance. They now loudly demanded ‘Bread
and Freedom’ and so challenged the whole
Soviet-backed system, though only in peaceful
demonstrations. The authorities reacted with
brute force. Army units fired into the crowds,
killing and wounding more than 300. Poles were
killing Poles. In the aftermath of these events in
Poznan the Politburo of the Polish Communist
Party was thrown into confusion by the deep divi-
sion between the Stalinists and the reformers.
According to the Stalinists the Poznan distur-
bance was the work of ‘enemy agents’; according
to reformers it was an expression of legitimate
grievances. Most worrying were demands of
‘freedom’, not just internal freedom, but freedom
from the Soviet Union. This, no Soviet leaders at
the time would tolerate and the Poles knew that
if Russia’s position were seriously threatened
Poland would be forcibly brought back into line.
Nevertheless the Polish reformists gained the
upper hand. ‘Workers’ councils’ were established
to bring a ‘democratic’ element into manage-
ment. A reform programme was adopted and
Gomulka emerged as its leading exponent on
the Central Committee. In the struggle with the
Stalinists he soon enjoyed extensive popular sup-
port in Warsaw and other cities. The crisis point
was reached in mid-October 1956. The Soviet
leadership became so alarmed that Khrushchev
and a high-powered Soviet delegation arrived
uninvited in Warsaw to halt the slide, which
might end in a repudiation of Soviet control and
of socialism. Soviet troop movements were set in
motion. Poland was on the brink of bloody con-
flict. It is interesting to compare the situations in
Poland and Hungary at this time and to ask why
an armed conflict developed in Hungary but was
averted in Poland.
It is clear that Khrushchev wanted to avoid a
military showdown, whether in Poland or in
Hungary, because he realised the immense setback
it would mean for his reformist policies and for his