cajolery, incentives and more subtle means of per-
suasion were employed. This method of proceed-
ing was greatly aided by a closely knit French
establishment.
A peculiarity of the French establishment was
the interrelationship of government, regional
administration, senior civil servants, politicians,
industrial management and higher education.
The French leadership was recruited from
elitist educational establishments. Young men
would be selected on academic merit for entry to
the École Polytechnique or the École Nationale
d’Administration, and then recruited into one of
the Grands Corps, where the career ladder
reaches to the top posts in the ministries or the
prefectoral administration. This elitist group of
graduates also runs the state industries and is to
be found in the private sector too. The close old-
boy network gets things done and counterbal-
ances the rigid administrative divisions of the
state. The expertise developed by groups of bril-
liant technocrats in engineering, in administration
and in business skills, together with their dedica-
tion to the state, which rewarded them hand-
somely with high salaries, created a powerful elite
that, in the unstable political conditions of the
Fourth Republic, spearheaded the drive for
modernisation in industry and agriculture.
Such a high degree of institutionalised elitism
has its weaknesses and its dangers too. It is fun-
damentally undemocratic. It is possible for those
of poor background through sheer talent to enter
one of the Écoles, but it is very much easier for
the children of the better-off Parisian families
who can afford the best education in preparation
for the competitive entrance examinations. Of
course, France is not unique in this respect. The
system tends to stifle talent and initiative lower
down; it also encourages patronage and allows
excessive influence to a small number. On the
other hand, it has provided France with an able
corps of innovators and administrators in key
positions, and so counteracted the disruptive
political and industrial conflicts that plagued the
Fourth Republic.
Monnet’s First Plan (1947–1952/4) concen-
trated on key sectors fundamental to a general
modernisation programme: coal, electricity, steel,
cement, the mechanisation of agriculture, fertilis-
ers and transportation. But the most immediate
needs of the workers for better housing and con-
sumer goods were largely sacrificed, with the
exception of food, to provide for a better future.
Nor were financial controls exerted, so the cur-
rency rapidly lost value which, in turn, created
industrial instability for most of the years of the
Fourth Republic. All efforts were directed to
improving the productivity of industry and agri-
culture. The result was not an overall advance
across the board, but the creation of some
modern, efficient and technologically progressive
industries and farms alongside the small, back-
ward nineteenth-century enterprises and peasant
holdings. It was too much to expect the First and
Second Plans (1947–57) to transform the whole
French economy; much of agriculture remained
backward and traditional attitudes prevailed
throughout France. Indeed, the difficulties facing
modernisers in France were great. There was no
large increase in the labour force, as there was in
West Germany. The waging of colonial wars, an
inefficient system of indirect taxation and high
inflation were all serious handicaps. But during
these hard times, which largely contributed to the
return of de Gaulle in 1958, the foundations were
laid for the expansion of the 1960s and later. The
modernising of key sectors enabled France to
compete successfully with West Germany. They
also provided 2 million more jobs, compared with
before the war, and productivity significantly
increased. From 1947 until the early 1960s, suc-
cessive plans had an important influence. As they
became more sophisticated after 1966 so French
administrations also became less interventionist.
Plans had to be ‘adapted’ in any case to reflect
economic realities such as the unexpected oil
shocks of the 1970s.
But for the majority of French workers and
small farmers the gradual transformation of
France, with islands of highly advanced technol-
ogy, did not mean rising standards of living in
accordance with their expectations. France con-
tinued to be a divided society of great inequali-
ties between the rich and the poor, between the
privileged technocrats of the École Polytechnique
and small businessmen and traditional peasant516 THE RECOVERY OF WESTERN EUROPE IN THE 1950s AND 1960s