Signals were also sent to the US that France
regarded NATO as an unequal alliance and
required change as the price of continued mem-
bership. In April 1959 de Gaulle forbade the pres-
ence of American nuclear weapons on bases in
France; but increasing French pressure for
changes to NATO that would give France a larger
voice failed to impress the Americans or the
British. And, however much the Germans wished
to maintain good relations with France, no
German chancellor would run the risk of alienat-
ing the US, on whose support the defence of the
Federal Republic against the Soviet Union prin-
cipally depended. In July 1966, after years of
growing non-cooperation, de Gaulle therefore
took the dramatic step of withdrawing France
from NATO’s integrated military command
structure altogether. But he was careful to main-
tain its political alliance with NATO. Indeed, de
Gaulle was conspicuous in supporting the US and
the NATO allies in every confrontation with the
Russians, over successive Berlin crises, the build-
ing of the Wall in 1961 and the Cuban missile
crisis in 1962.
By 1966, de Gaulle appeared to be overplaying
his hand and his policies carried less conviction.
His stately visits to the Third World, Latin
America and Canada earned him personal
applause but no tangible benefits for France,
which was seen as dangerously anti-American.
Adenauer’s successors, Erhard and Kiesinger, were
less inclined to accept French tutelage as Germany
recovered not only its economic strength but its
confidence too. De Gaulle irritated his EEC part-
ners in 1965 by boycotting the Common Market
when its members tried to move towards majority
voting at the Council of Ministers. After several
months, the French in 1966 won the so-called
Luxembourg Compromise which, in effect,
allowed each member to oppose a majority vote
when it considered its vital interests were at stake.
De Gaulle had halted the move toward suprana-
tionalism. This stance accorded with the views of
the British government (which had applied to join
the club) and ironically made possible the later
accession of Britain, which de Gaulle had vetoed
in January 1963 and November 1967. France’s
five partners, too, were now anxious to bring in
Britain to check France and did not take kindly to
his Olympian despatch of Britain’s applications.Elected for a second term as president in
December 1965 on, admittedly, a reduced major-
ity, de Gaulle at the age of seventy-five was still
seen as indispensable to the maintenance of sta-
bility. But Mitterrand, the candidate of the united
left, had also impressed and with 32 per cent of
the vote was only 11 per cent behind the general.
Internationally, de Gaulle had succeeded in
winning back an independent role for France. The
question which now arose was what he would do
with it, how he would exploit France’s position
to break the superpower deadlock. A visit to the
Soviet Union in the summer of 1966 led to agree-
ment on Franco-Soviet consultations, but de
Gaulle could make no headway in achieving his
real aim of freeing Europe from Soviet and
American military dominance. The time was not
yet ripe for de Gaulle’s vision.
In world affairs de Gaulle took up positions
diametrically opposed to American policy. He
advised the Americans to leave Vietnam and
during the 1967 Six-Day War reversed France’s
traditional policy of support for Israel against the
Arabs. Visiting Canada that summer, his behav-
iour seemed downright quixotic when he encour-
aged separatism in French Canada by declaring in
Montreal, ‘Vive le Québec Libre’. This was
blatant interference in Canadian affairs, though
French influence had been lost for good in that
country two centuries earlier. Visiting Poland, de
Gaulle openly encouraged Polish nationalism.
Not only did de Gaulle surprise the world with
his policies and pronouncements, but the per-
sonal exercise of power began to cause misgivings
in France too. By the close of the 1960s, a great
swing of the pendulum was in the making. French
society was no longer uniformly ready to trust and
follow its remote and grand leader. The divisions
made themselves felt in the explosion of May
1968, which almost removed de Gaulle; he mas-
tered the crisis but his prestige was irreparably
damaged.
The May outburst had several causes, some
of them loosely connected. It was followed by
an apparently overwhelming Gaullist electoral532 THE RECOVERY OF WESTERN EUROPE IN THE 1950s AND 1960s