Organisation. The Americans pressed for West
German rearmament, while the French, looking
back on their historical experience, felt grave mis-
givings. The attempt to overcome these difficul-
ties by creating a West European Defence
Community (the Pleven Plan) finally failed when
the French Assembly rejected ratification in
August 1954. Britain had been willing to join not
as a full member but only as an ally, thus indi-
cating again its unwillingness to give up its status
as the third great power and to combine with its
continental allies as an equal European. Eden was
the principal architect of the compromises that
created the framework for West European
defence at a nine-power conference over which he
presided in London in the autumn of 1954. This
was followed by the formal treaty signatures, the
Paris Agreements, in October. With the admis-
sion of Italy and the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Brussels Treaty Organisation was
superseded by a Council of West European
Union. That winter West Germany was admitted
as a member of NATO. The Federal Republic of
Germany had been restored to full sovereignty,
but had agreed to certain restrictions, the most
important of which was not to manufacture
nuclear weapons. Berlin alone retained its status
as an occupied city, since any Western alteration
of the agreements reached with the Soviet Union
would have opened the way for the Russians to
declare them void. Eden had demonstrated full
British support for a restored West Germany and
for the military defence of Western Europe in
alliance with the US and Canada. Thus West
European Union and NATO were closely linked.
But the British policy of keeping its distance from
continental Europe was also confirmed.
Eden’s second triumph was to preside over and
bring to a successful conclusion the Geneva
Conference in 1954, which extricated France
from Indo-China. Unfortunately in the longer
term this proved to be only another act in the
tragedy of Vietnam. In the same year as these
diplomatic successes Eden began to negotiate the
treaties intended to place Anglo-Egyptian rela-
tions on an entirely new and friendly basis; they
provided for the withdrawal of the British from
Suez, but allowed the retention of the military
base in emergencies. A group of Conservative
MPs responded by accusing him of weakness.
Eden was hypersensitive to charges of appease-
ment, and the shadow of Munich was to over-
whelm his good judgement. The fuse was laid for
the Suez Crisis two years later. Churchill finally
accepted retirement in April 1955, the unavoid-
able consequence of his age and ill health. Eden
called an election in May and won comfortably.
The new prime minister entered 10 Downing
Street with the broad support of the party and
Conservative voters behind him. Yet the impres-
sion soon grew that he lacked the leadership qual-
ities of a prime minister. The economy was not
going well either. Eden’s health was suspect and
the constant disparagement unsettled him, by
nature impatient of criticism. The Suez invasion
had widespread support from a public that saw
this drastic action as a signal to the rest of the
world that Britain could not be pushed about.
But a more considered view, highly critical of
Eden, was expressed among both Conservative
and Labour members of parliament. Gaitskell
(who had replaced Attlee as leader of the Labour
Party in December 1955) was particularly vehe-
ment in his attacks on the prime minister. When
the Suez expedition failed, Eden’s health com-
pletely broke down and he left London to recu-
perate in the West Indies. During his absence
Butler acted as de facto prime minister.
When Eden resigned in January 1957, the pre-
miership did not pass to Butler, as had been widely
expected. Since the Conservative Party had no
leader, the queen sought the advice of senior
Conservatives, among them Churchill and Lord
Salisbury. Soundings were also taken among min-
isters. The shadow of Munich and appeasement
still clung to Butler, and the preferred candidate
was Harold Macmillan. His record seemed to be
one of brilliant achievement. As Churchill’s repre-
sentative in the Mediterranean from 1943 to
1945, he had mastered the complex political
problems of rival French, American and British
interests in North Africa and later in Italy. Shrewd,
ambitious, tough and ruthless when the need
arose, Macmillan politically dominated the decade
from the mid-1950s until ill health and fatigue
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