The fragile stability achieved after the Korean War
armistice (1953) and the Geneva settlements of
the Indo-Chinese question (1954) did not last
long. With the rise of Khrushchev, the Soviet
Union was pursuing a much more dynamic and
aggressive policy in regions from which its influ-
ence had previously been almost wholly excluded.
The USSR had backed Nasser’s Egypt in the
Middle East; it had sought to offset American
economic pressure by purchasing Cuba’s princi-
pal export, sugar; in civil war in the recently inde-
pendent Belgian Congo (now Zaire) it supported
the left-wing leader Lumumba (and so began
meddling in Africa); in Europe relations were
uncertain still over the issue of divided Germany
and in particular over the future of Berlin. In
south-east Asia after the defeat of the French by
Ho Chi-minh and General Giap in the summer
of 1954, there appeared to be a chance of a nego-
tiated solution. The Geneva Conference of that
year had resulted in a number of agreements and
compromises. The fighting was ended, and
Vietnam was divided close to the 17th parallel,
with the North Vietnamese controlling what
became the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
recognised by the communist states; in the south
arose the anti-communist Republic of Vietnam.
Vietnam, it was proposed, would be unified again
following elections in July 1956. In Laos, which
was not divided, the communist Pathet Lao had
made far less progress, though they were granted
de facto control of the two northern provinces.The French undertook to withdraw their forces
from Laos and Vietnam, and no foreign troops
were to enter those countries or to establish bases
there; excluded from this provision were a speci-
fied number of military advisers – thus a small
French mission continued for a time in South
Vietnam and Laos.
The two crucial features of the Geneva
Accords were thus that Vietnam and Laos were
to remain unitary states whose future would be
decided by elections, and that no foreign troops
were permitted to assist North or South Vietnam.
But, from the start, the prohibition against the
introduction of foreign ‘arms and munitions’
(Article 4) was a dead letter. Eisenhower and
Secretary of State Dulles regarded the Geneva
Accords as appeasement of communism and a
defeat for the free world. They dissociated them-
selves from the agreements but promised not to
overturn them by force provided there was no
aggression from the North. They also expressed
doubts about the all-Vietnamese elections and
insisted that they be held under the auspices of
the United Nations. The South Vietnamese gov-
ernment, headed by the Catholic Ngo Dinh
Diem, refused to sign any of the treaties but
carried out the military truce conditions.
Eisenhower’s conduct in 1954 marked another
turning point in the tragic history of Vietnam –
and of the US’s involvement in that tragedy, which
led to extensive sacrifices in men, material and, a
decade later, social cohesion. What Eisenhower(^1) Chapter 51
AMERICA’S MISSION IN THE WORLD
THE EISENHOWER AND KENNEDY YEARS,
1954–63