first strike against the Soviet Union. Khrushchev
knew that the Soviet Union was, indeed, hope-
lessly inferior in nuclear missile strength, that it
was ringed by nuclear bases from Turkey to
Western Europe and that American superiority
placed him in a poor bargaining position over
Berlin and other areas of conflict. Bluff was his
answer. The Soviet Union would act like a super-
power until it could catch up. Khrushchev had
boasted that the march of communism in the
world could not be stopped. Cuba was a test. The
Soviet Union must be seen to stand by its only
ally in the Americas. ‘Coexistence’ did not mean
softness, as Mao was claiming.
The crisis had its roots in April and May 1962.
Khrushchev conceived of a ‘brilliant’ stroke. He
would move missiles into Cuba. They would act
as a deterrent, protect Cuba from invasion and
help to even up the balance of power. Khrushchev
rejected the misgivings of Foreign Minister
Gromyko and the wily old Armenian Bolshevik
Mikoyan. On 24 May the Praesidium approved
the plan. Khrushchev was playing for high stakes,
at home and internationally.
Liberalisation in Moscow and the open access
to US archives make it possible to reconstruct
what went on in the White House and the
Kremlin during the crisis. That the Soviet Union
in 1962 was engaged in arming Cuba was no
secret. The ships carrying missiles in their holds
and under tarpaulins could not be made invisible
on the high seas. The high-flying U-2 planes were
able to spy on the island and photograph with
great accuracy and detail what was going on. On
29 August a spy plane took pictures of Soviet tech-
nicians constructing a SAM (surface-to-air missile)
launching pad. Four days later, Washington being
a leaky place, a Republican senator raised the pos-
sibility that the Soviets might be stationing in
Cuba short-range and intermediate missiles with a
maximum range of 2,500 miles. That would
enable them to reach Washington, New York and
other US cities. Both Houses of Congress now
passed resolutions authorising military interven-
tion should that prove necessary. Kennedy had to
do something, even though SAM missiles were
clearly defensive, but he did not wish to provoke a
crisis needlessly. He and most of his advisers did
not think it at all likely that Khrushchev would be
foolhardy enough to introduce offensive long-
range nuclear missiles. Still, public apprehension
and the demand for action required a weighty pro-
nouncement. It came on 12 September. Kennedy
held a news conference and declared that the US
would do ‘whatever must be done’ to protect its
security and that of its allies if any offensive base
was established by the Soviet Union in the
Western hemisphere.
A crisis now became inevitable. How far
Kennedy had changed his mind about the mili-
tary significance of Soviet missiles in Cuba is not
clear. What is certain is that the political fallout
in the US would have been devastating had the
administration just tacitly accepted a Soviet
missile base in Cuba. Kennedy’s mistake had been
to trust Khrushchev. The warning came too late.
Long- and medium-range missiles were already
on the island and more nuclear missiles were
on the way. Khrushchev, in his ignorance of the
US political climate, had grossly miscalculated
the likely reaction of the president. With the
congressional elections looming, Khrushchev
thought that Kennedy would hide the fact that
missile bases were being constructed in Cuba if
he found out about them. Such a cover-up was
possible in the Soviet Union but not in the US,
where political opponents and a free press could
not be silenced.
Kennedy could not afford another defeat over
Cuba. He had allowed the Russians to send large
quantities of military equipment to Cuba after the
Bay of Pigs and could do little to counter
Khrushchev’s boast of defending Cuba. But he
could not allow his position to be publicly under-
mined any further. He could not, of course, reveal
his own secret plans to get rid of Castro;
Operation Mongoose would have given the lie to
assertions that he was soft on communism, but
public knowledge would have caused an inter-
national outcry.
During the crisis itself credit must go to
Kennedy for keeping options open and for not
reacting in haste. He received much conflicting
advice. Even his brother Robert Kennedy, the
attorney-general, had swung from hawkish to
dovish moods during the crisis days. Most of the
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