they had been lying was true. The missile threat
appeared real enough. No wonder the American
people felt threatened when maps appeared with
arcs showing that missiles launched in Cuba could
reach most of the US. The Soviet gamble was pre-
sented as pointing a dagger to the heart of
America.
Kennedy’s first countermove was the naval
blockade, proclaimed on 23 October after OAS
approval. This less aggressive option was in line
with the advice given by the British ambassador
in Washington, David Ormsby-Gore, a close
friend of the Kennedys. Ormsby-Gore, moreover,
contributed the suggestion that the line of block-
ade be set up not 800 miles, but 500 miles from
Cuba, so as to give the Kremlin more time for
reflection. Thus the die was cast. US forces,
including B-52 bombers armed with nuclear
weapons, were put on alert. How would the
Russians react now?
On 24 October, as has already been related,
two Soviet ships reached the blockade and halted.
During the next five days, oil tankers and ‘inof-
fensive’ Soviet vessels were allowed through. The
crisis, however, was far from over. The missile
sites in Cuba were still being feverishly prepared.
Kennedy insisted that they should be dismantled.
A new crisis loomed. Soviet intentions were dan-
gerously unclear in Washington.
The missiles had been placed in Cuba to deter.
Khrushchev was determined to defend Cuba; like
Castro, he expected the Americans to invade
unless effectively deterred. But deterrence was
bluff. The long-range missiles would not have
been fired. The defence of Cuba was not worth
the destruction of the USSR.
On 25 October at the United Nations Adlai
Stevenson worsted the Soviet delegate with dra-
matic proof of Russia’s deception, and television
pictures of the UN confrontation were shown
all over the Western world. The following day,
the possibility of a deal was first suggested by the
Soviet side. Alexander Fomin, counsellor at the
Soviet Embassy but, according to US intelligence
resources, in reality a KGB colonel, asked John
Scali, a journalist, to lunch with him at the
Occidental, a restaurant close to the White House
whose well-known advertisement ran, ‘where
statesmen dine’. The agent outlined the deal: if
the US undertook not to invade Cuba now or
later, then the Russian missiles would be
removed. When Secretary of State Rusk was told,
he accompanied Scali to the White House to
inform the president. That same evening a long
rambling letter from Khrushchev, confused but
friendly in tone, reached the White House. The
most important passages suggested that the
Soviet Union would not carry arms to Cuba if
the president would give an assurance that the
US would not attack Cuba. It was much vaguer
than Fomin’s proposal, but it likewise seemed
to indicate the beginnings of a deal. Scali was
instructed to meet Fomin again and to assure him
that the US saw possibilities in the deal but that
there was little time left. To the present day we
do not know whether Fomin was acting on his
own initiative, but in Washington his proposal
was regarded as emanating from the Kremlin. It
lent more substance to Khrushchev’s own vague
proposals.
The following day, Saturday, 27 October,
another letter was received from Khrushchev,
sharper and more definite. This time he undertook
to remove the offensive missiles from Cuba, but
he added that to emphasise equality he required
the removal of American missiles from Turkey. It
was a face-saving device and nothing illustrates the
military unreality better than the fact that the US
regarded the old Jupiter missiles in Turkey as use-
less anyway and had wanted to remove them in
- But now they could not openly agree with-
out appearing to give Khrushchev a justification
for having sent missiles to Cuba.
As Kennedy and his advisers were debating
how to react to Khrushchev’s two letters, the
news reached the White House that a U-2 plane
over Cuba had been shot down by a surface-to-
air missile, killing the pilot. The atmosphere
entirely changed. It was mistakenly assumed that
this was a deliberate Soviet escalation. In fact, the
Soviet commanders in Cuba had acted on their
own initiative, stretching the authority to defend
themselves. The US chiefs of staff, who had been
urging stronger action than a naval blockade, now
pressed for an air strike and the launching of an
invasion. Kennedy, too, asked how U-2 planes
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