The intellectual ferment in China settled down
surprisingly quickly. Dissent is kept under wraps.
One explanation is the booming economy and
rising standards of living, faster since the 1990s
in the cities than in the countryside. The senior
leader, Deng Xiaoping, observed with satisfaction
that he had chosen the right course. Political lib-
eralisation, perestroika, in the Soviet Union had
accompanied economic reform, and made com-
mercial modernisation infinitely more difficult
and led to conflict and the disintegration of the
Soviet state. The Chinese people would be less
concerned with notions of Western-style democ-
racy if the party could deliver higher standards of
living, and a plentiful supply of enticing consumer
goods. Beijing has been transformed, with its
modern hotels, department stores, foreign goods,
Benetton sweaters and monied inhabitants.
China’s immense land mass is divided between
some wealthy regions and impoverished lands.
The Fourteenth Communist Party Congress
which met in October 1992 confirmed the policy
the 89-year-old Deng had tenaciously followed
for fifteen years: the transition to a mixed social-
ist market economy, called for appearance’s sake
‘the socialist market economy’, presided over by
a communist party with a monopoly of political
power. China was going its own way yet again.
The spectacular growth of China’s economy
represents a tantalising opportunity for Western
business; a whole new frontier appeared to be
opening up. But Western governments have had
to grapple with the dilemma of dealing with a
regime whose human rights record is at the same
time condemned by them. Can moral principles
outweigh national interest when the furtherance
of trade contributes to prosperity and employ-
ment at home? The Clinton administration faced
this issue by granting Chinese exports unhindered
access to the US market in order to secure
improvements in the way the Chinese authorities
treated their dissidents. Success has been limited.
For Britain, compelled to hand over the colony
in 1997, Hong Kong was an Achilles heel.
Belated attempts to introduce democratic ele-
ments in government were met by a furious reac-
tion in Beijing and threats to dismantle what had
been done without China’s approval.
With the death of Deng in February 1997
China’s leaders have to grapple with China’s
enormous problems of modernisation, with the
uneven development of the regions, with corrup-
tion, but also with millions of people who for the
first time have access to information about life in
the West. Satellite dishes and the Internet may in
the end prove more powerful than tanks. The
Fifteenth Congress gathered in September 1997.
The vast Hall of the People was filled to capacity
with delegates applauding in unison and voting as
one. Flanked by flowers, China’s leaders delivered
their speeches from the raised platform. This
stage-managed scene, transmitted through-
out China and all over the world, demonstrated
the unity of purpose of a monolithic nation.
However, these images were a distortion of the
truth. China has had to cope with serious ten-
sions. A rapid and uneven transformation, the
reult of Deng’s drive to bring about accelerated
development, widened the gap between the
coastal regions and middle China and created dif-
ferences even between neighbouring districts.
Rapid growth caused inflation in the early 1990s
and was followed by austerity before growth
could be resumed. The path followed in politics,
by way of contrast, was steady repression. With
the crushing of the Tiananmen Democracy
Protest movement in 1989, the search for polit-
ical reform was over. Deng believed that the
Chinese people would be diverted and reconciled
to party rule by increased prosperity. As long as
criticism was judged ‘constructive’ within narrow
limits a small measure of individual freedom of
expression was allowed – but only if the funda-
mental aims of the party and the leadership
remained unchallenged. Democracy, the tolera-
tion of an opposition, has remained anathema.
Amid all the problems caused by China’s trans-
formation, the Politburo in Beijing feared that if
it lost its grip chaos would ensue – provinces
would take their fate in their own hands,
Tibetans, Mongolians and the non-Han Chinese
in border regions would rise up and fight for
independence, and in the heart of China tensions
could escalate into rural rebellions.
There have been large economic gains since
the 1990s but they have been unequally shared.
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