of civil war and that he would hold elections
within ninety days, whereupon he would hand
power back to the elected civilian government. It
was the first of his many broken promises. To rid
himself of Bhutto, meanwhile, the fallen prime
minister was tried and then, despite worldwide
protest, hanged in 1979. After that, Zia made
little pretence of ruling other than dictatorially.
Zia’s excuse for exercising arbitrary power was
the need to wage a moral crusade to create an
Islamic state. He devoted himself to arresting,
imprisoning and executing his political opponents
and army rivals. Martial law was declared, and the
remnants of civil liberties and political parties
were destroyed. Yet this tyrant won the support
of the West. Once more the Cold War had dis-
torted Western perceptions of priorities. The
decisive event was the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979. Pakistan became
the base from which the Afghan mujahideen were
supplied. Moreover, since the Soviet invasion was
interpreted as a threat to the oil-rich Persian Gulf,
Pakistan once more was seen as a crucial military
bulwark of the West. An earlier US arms embargo
was reversed into massive US military and eco-
nomic aid.
By 1983 it appeared to Zia expedient, both for
internal reasons and to improve his image in the
West, to incorporate some civilian ministers and
a controlled electoral body into the governing
structure of the country. The assemblies so
elected were to be Islamic rather than parliamen-
tary, and were not to feature competing political
parties. The National Assembly elected in 1985
nevertheless showed signs that it saw its own cre-
ation as only the first step in the transfer of power
from the military. There was a strong revival of
political activity. Miss Benazir Bhutto, the daugh-
ter of the prime minister hanged by Zia, was
allowed to return to Pakistan in 1986 and
attracted large crowds at her rallies. The prime
minister and his government, appointed by Zia,
showed an unwelcome desire for real power. It
was no surprise when, in May 1988, the prime
minister was dismissed and the Assembly was dis-
solved. But a return to further authoritarian mil-
itary rule was avoided by an accident, the death
of Zia in a plane crash in August 1988. The
promised new elections were held in November
and Miss Benazir Bhutto emerged as the winner
with the PPP gaining the largest number of seats
of any party. It was a startling result for a Muslim
country – the first woman prime minister.
The West, especially the US administration,
heaved a sigh of relief at being rid of the blemish
of association with Zia. Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto promised to continue the pro-Western
Afghan policy of her predecessor but the lessening
of Soviet–US hostility as the Cold War came to an
end made the military establishment less import-
ant in American eyes. Benazir Bhutto’s hold on
power was fragile, dependent on maintaining a
coalition partnership with an unreliable ethnic
party. The government could make little headway
in solving the country’s economic problems, in
easing regional tensions with the provinces or in
improving its international position. The Afghan
Civil War continued even after the departure of
Soviet troops in December 1989, and millions of
refugees remained across the border in Pakistan.
With democracy restored, Pakistan was welcomed
back into the Commonwealth, but the most seri-
ous problem – the perennial conflict over the
future of Kashmir – was brought no nearer to a
solution. In 1990 Benazir Bhutto was dismissed,
accused of leading a corrupt government. After
fresh elections her fall from power was confirmed
by the voters. In the early 1990s the army contin-
ued to abide by its undertaking not to intervene.
Parliamentary democracy, however, remained a
fragile plant in Pakistan.
In Pakistan, life and politics have shown little
improvement in the 1990s. Since the end of
the Cold War, and the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan, for the US Pakistan’s role as a key ally
had seemingly ended. The US became concerned
to foil its attempts to build nuclear weapons. The
principal 500 families continue to hold most of
the land and inequality remains extreme. Violence
broke out in bitter clashes between militant sec-
ond-generation Muslim refugees from India, the
Mohajirs, and government forces. In the mid-
1990s the Mohajirs sought to combat discrim-
ination by forming their own political party;
attempts to crush the violent protests led to more
than 2,000 deaths, mainly in Karachi. Meanwhile,
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