- The real threat in 1914 was felt to be not
Serbia but Serbia in alliance with Russia.
Security and integrity are basic objectives of
any state’s foreign policy. But the great powers of
pre-1914 Europe also considered it axiomatic that
they should possess spheres of influence and con-
trol beyond their own state frontiers. In the nine-
teenth century the Habsburgs were forced to
abandon their traditional role of influence first in
the Italian and then in the German states. By the
twentieth century the only ‘frontier’ left open was
the Balkan. Not to suffer a third defeat on this last
frontier was seen as a matter of vital importance
for the future of the empire.
With the decline of the Ottoman Empire in
Europe the future of the Balkan peoples, divided
and intermingled in religious beliefs, in tradition,
in culture and in socio-economic structure, pre-
occupied the European great powers. But the
Balkan states pursued policies of their own and
were locked in rivalry over the disposition of the
still Turkish or formerly Turkish lands.
Once Russia had recovered from defeat in the
Far East, the attention of St Petersburg reverted
to the Balkans and a rediscovery of Russia’s Slav
mission. A much more active Russian policy now
coincided with a new period of Ottoman weak-
ness caused by the internal upheavals of the
Young Turk movement (1908 to 1910). It also
coincided with the growing ambitions and rival-
ries of the Balkan states, themselves casting cov-
etous eyes on Macedonia and other territories still
ruled by the Turks. The Balkans were becoming
a powder barrel. Austro-Russian cooperation
might have contained these tensions. Instead,
Russia’s ambitious ministers at the various Balkan
capitals were adding to the growing turmoil. The
turning point came in 1908–9.
In the Monarchy, the foreign minister Count
Aehrenthal was a well-known advocate of a policy
of cooperation and agreement with Russia. He
regarded Austria-Hungary as a ‘satiated’ state that
needed no more territories and no more Slavs. But
as a final step of consolidation – almost a technical
consolidation – whose purpose was to regularise
and remove all uncertainty, he wished to convert
the Monarchy’s position in Bosnia-Herzegovina
from that of the permanently occupying power
(since 1878) to one of sovereignty. He was pre-
pared to pay compensation to the Turks and to
give up the occupation of another Turkish terri-
tory, the strategically important land known as
Novipazar. This withdrawal would also convince
the Russians that Austria-Hungary had abandoned
all thought of territorial expansion. Talks were
arranged with the Russian foreign minister,
Alexander Izvolski. Their famous, and unrecorded,
conversation took place at the castle of Buchlau
in 1908. From the available evidence it seems
clear that the whole basis of these talks was the
intention to strengthen Austro-Russian coopera-
tion. Izvolski said that Russia would diplomatically
support Austria-Hungary’s wish to annex Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In return he asked for, and obtained,
Aehrenthal’s promise of diplomatic support for a
Russian proposal to the powers to change the rule
of the Straits. Aehrenthal soon after, while Izvolski
toured Western Europe and had not even time to
consult the tsar about the Buchlau ‘bargain’,
announced the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
to Europe. Izvolski was furious. He had no success
with his attempt to change the rule of the Straits:
Britain rejected the proposal outright. To save
face, Izvolski now claimed he had been tricked by
Aehrenthal.
From here on the threads lead to the cata-
strophe of 1914. Out of the breakdown of rela-
tions between Izvolski and Aehrenthal grew the
prolonged Bosnian crisis. Serbia’s nationalist feel-
ings had been wildly aroused by the Monarchy’s
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited
by many Serbs. Russia backed Serbia and was
insistent on ‘compensation’ for Serbia and also
that the Monarchy should submit the whole
question of annexation to a conference of powers.
With the German ally’s support, Aehrenthal
refused both demands. Russia and Britain and
France backed away. Serbia did not. In 1909
Serbia and Austria-Hungary came close to war,
with Russia acting as Serbia’s protector. In reality
neither Russia nor any of the powers were ready
for war in 1909. One cannot help speculating how
different a course history might have taken if
Austria-Hungary had used its superior strength to
defeat Serbia then. As it was, Izvolski drew back.
On Germany fell the odium of having threatened
52 SOCIAL CHANGE AND NATIONAL RIVALRY IN EUROPE, 1900–14
