staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, moreover, pointed
out that, if Russia intervened, the Austro-
Hungarian army would need German military
cooperation to cope successfully with a war on two
fronts, the Serbian and Russian. The Monarchy’s
ministers were in any case convinced that the
Monarchy could not risk war with Russia unless
the German ally stood side by side with Austria-
Hungary in war. Would the imperial German gov-
ernment support the Monarchy now? The third
obstacle to war was internal, the opposition of the
Hungarian prime minister, Count Tisza.
On 4 July 1914, the Council of Ministers,
meeting in Vienna, decided that the first step was
to ascertain the attitude of the kaiser and his min-
isters. Count Hoyos was sent to Berlin with a per-
sonal letter from Emperor Franz Josef to the
kaiser, and a set of questions from the Monarchy’s
ministers. They did not beat about the bush,
but wanted to know whether Germany would
come to Austria-Hungary’s help if Russia chose
to intervene on behalf of Serbia. They also
explained what was in store for Serbia. Serbia
would be eliminated ‘as a power factor in the
Balkans’.
From a variety of recorded conversations, in
Berlin, for two years and more there had been
mounting fears about the planned expansion of
Russian military power. The weakness of the
Habsburg Monarchy became increasingly appar-
ent, and there were serious doubts about its future
after the old emperor’s death, which could not be
long delayed. There were also nagging doubts
about Austria-Hungary’s loyalty to the alliance
with Germany. Would the alliance survive if
Germany once again forced the Monarchy to
desist from doing what it thought imperative for
its survival – to show it was stronger than Serbia
and would not tolerate Serbian hostility? Imperial
Germany felt it needed the support of Austria-
Hungary if the mass Russian Slav armies were to
be checked. A war with Russia arising out of an
Austro-Serb conflict would ensure the Monarchy’s
support. A war starting between Germany and
Russia, or Germany and France, might not find
Austria-Hungary on Germany’s side. Then there
was a calculation of quite a different kind.
Bethmann Hollweg hoped to weaken, perhaps
even to break up, the alignment of Russia, France
and Britain. Bethmann Hollweg’s calculations
were all based on ‘ifs’. If Russia should decide to
back Serbia and then applied to Paris for backing,
and if France then refused to risk war with
Germany so that Russia might threaten Austria-
Hungary with war, Russia would discover that the
French alliance was, in reality, worthless. Ifall this
happened then Germany would be in a position to
win back Russia’s friendship, perhaps even its
alliance. If, on the other hand, it should come to
war, then better now than later. But the Dual
Monarchy must initiate the war so that at home it
could be presented as being fought in defence of
Germany’s ally against tsarist Russia. Russia would
be cast in the role of aggressor.
The critical discussions between the kaiser,
Bethmann Hollweg and the military took place
immediately after the arrival of Count Hoyos in
Berlin. The decision, when it was reached, was
not the kaiser’s alone. That is a myth. The deci-
sion was to back Austria-Hungary to the hilt, with
German military support if necessary, should
Russia intervene to prevent the Dual Monarchy
from dealing with Serbia. The Habsburg minis-
ters were given a free hand to settle with Serbia
in any way they thought appropriate. That was
the message to Vienna on 6 July, the kaiser’s
famous ‘blank cheque’. The Habsburg ministers
were also urged to act quickly against Serbia while
the governments of Europe were still shocked by
the assassinations at Sarajevo. In Germany, the
chief of staff, General Moltke, continued his
health cure at the spa of Karlsbad. Admiral Tirpitz
stayed away from Berlin and the kaiser departed
on his yacht to cruise in the North Sea. Every-
thing was done to avoid an air of crisis, to cam-
ouflage the impending Habsburg action. Why? It
could only have been to allay British, Russian and
French suspicions that Germany secretly stood
behind Austria-Hungary. A diplomatic triumph
for Austria-Hungary and Germany was still
preferable to war. Europe was to be faced with a
sudden fait accompli.
What went wrong? In Vienna the ministers
were not unanimous, even after receiving the
German assurances. Count Tisza, the powerful