officially announced. The line was now to put pres-
sure on Austria-Hungary.
The following day, 25 July, the tsar at an impe-
rial council confirmed the need for preparatory
military measures in anticipation of partial mobili-
sation. By 26 July, these secret preparations were
in full swing. The news of the Austrian declaration
of war on Serbia and bombardment of Belgrade
on 29 July threw St Petersburg into a frenzy. The
tsar agreed to a general mobilisation, but after
receiving the kaiser’s telegram changed this to a
‘partial mobilisation’, against Austria only. In real-
ity, though, the tsar’s motive was to avoid pushing
Germany into mobilisation – partial or total made
no difference, for the Austro-Hungarian-German
alliance and campaign plans would necessitate
German mobilisation anyway. It was too late in
Berlin to continue playing the game of ‘localising’
the Austro-Serbian war. With the military in
Berlin now also in a frenzy, Moltke insisting on
the need to mobilise, Bethmann Hollweg and the
kaiser could not resist the ‘military imperative’
much longer. On 31 July, the Russian military
persuaded the tsar that a ‘partial mobilisation’ was
technically impossible, and Nicholas II consented
to general mobilisation. But the nature of German
military planning had made war inevitable after
the Russian partial mobilisation on 29 July.
The very concept of the Schlieffen Plan was
responsible for the situation that mobilisation
meant war. Its implications may not have been
grasped fully by the kaiser and Bethmann
Hollweg in July. But in militaristic Wilhelmine
Germany, the generals’ views on military neces-
sity were conclusive. Until the moment of Russian
mobilisation, Moltke, the chief of staff was
ready to leave control to Chancellor Bethmann
Hollweg. But, when on 30 July it became clear
that the chancellor’s policy of frightening Russia
into acquiescence had failed, there was not a
moment to lose. France had to be defeated before
Russia could complete her mobilisation. The
German onslaught must now start without delay
against Belgium and France. Ultimatums were
sent to Russia and France and war was declared
with unseemly haste on Russia on 1 August 1914,
and on France two days later. The German inva-
sion of Belgium was followed by a British ulti-
matum and declaration of war on 4 August.
It was the same Schlieffen Plan that was
responsible for forcing the pace in St Petersburg
and Paris. That the Germans would at the outset
turn the mass of their armies against France and
not Russia was known. The Russian–French mil-
itary plans were constructed accordingly, with the
promise of an early Russian offensive to relieve
pressure on the French. That is why the French
military were so worried about ‘partial mobilisa-
tion’ against Austria-Hungary. In the event of war
they wanted Russia’s military effort to be directed
against the main enemy, Germany. No wonder
Paléologue was urging full mobilisation in St
Petersburg. In this way was Bethmann Hollweg’s
diplomatic ‘offensive’ matched by the offensive
strategy of the German general staff with its aim
of destroying the French will to resist by seeking
total victory in the west.
Behind the ‘governments’ – the handful of men
who made the decisions in Berlin, Vienna, Paris
and St Petersburg – stood populations willing to
fight for republic, king and emperor. Only a tiny
minority dissented. For the largest socialist party in
Europe, the German, the war was accepted as
being fought against tsarist Russian aggression.
The different nationalities of the Dual Monarchy
all fought for the Habsburgs, the French socialists
fought as enthusiastically in defence of their father-
land ruthlessly invaded by the Germans.
The responsibility for starting the conflict in
July and August must rest primarily on the shoul-
ders of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Russia and
France reacted and chose to fight rather than to
withdraw from the confrontation, which would
have left the diplomatic victory to Germany and
Austria-Hungary. Whether they had wisely inter-
preted their national interests is another question.
For Britain it was a preventive war. Not directly
threatened by Germany, Britain was looking to
the future and what that future would hold for it
if Germany were able to gain the mastery of con-
tinental Europe. But Britain’s was a ‘preventive’
war in quite a different sense to Germany’s. The
British government had done everything possible
to prevent war from breaking out, but the Cabinet
decided it could not afford to stand aside.
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