The abuses of the Somoza family, their amass-
ing of enormous wealth and the general corruption
had made them many enemies, especially among
those who had not shared the spoils. These groups
ranged from the right, conservatives opposed to
any genuine democratic reform, through to the
professional and mercantile middle sectors, and
to the socialists and Marxists. It was an alliance of
the left that formed the first guerrilla groups of the
1960s, recruiting support from peasants and stu-
dents. The corruption and repression following on
the Managuan earthquake of 1972 broadened
the opposition. After the assassination in 1978 of
the respected editor of the leading newspaper in
Nicaragua, La Prensa, the middle class and conser-
vatives were ready to support armed opposition
against Somoza. FSLN forces with Cuban help
were now well organised and, in a series of attacks,
demoralised the National Guard and seized power
on 19 July 1979. Somoza fled the country.
The revolutionary junta was dominated by
the Marxist–Leninist leadership from the start.
Decision-making was collective. FSLN’s most
influential figures were the hardline Tomás Borge
Martinez and the two brothers Humberto Ortega
and Daniel Ortega. The junta was more prag-
matic than most communist regimes, permitting
some degree of political plurality and private own-
ership. But it was equally determined on the
Leninist Soviet model to retain real power and
build a socialist society. The National Assembly
reflected the firm control the junta exercised over
the country through the revolutionary party, the
army and the state security services. Until its
closure in 1986, La Prensaremained a lone voice
in opposition. Throughout the country there was
censorship and control of the domestic media.
During the 1980s, splits began to occur among
the junta. The more moderate coalition partners
of the original Council of State went into exile,
leaving the country under the domination of the
FSLN. In exile also were remnants of Somoza’s
National Guard and dissidents from FSLN’s
regime. Together they formed disparate guerrilla
bands on Nicaragua’s borders, the so-called
Contras, who, with the help of supplies from the
US, waged a guerrilla war against the Sandinistas.
Within Nicaragua the junta did not honour its
commitment in 1979 to establish a democracy, but
postponed elections until its power was consoli-
dated in 1984. Daniel Ortega became president.
By adopting a programme of reforms from above,
and by mobilising nationalist feelings against the
US and its support for the Contras, the junta was
able to dominate Nicaragua for a decade, backed
by the powerful party and security apparatus. The
main opposition refused to participate in elections
before 1990. In health care, housing and particu-
larly education, the Sandinistas nevertheless
achieved progress. State planning and land reforms
were instituted more gradually. But the combina-
tion of the effects of the civil war, the huge
resources devoted to building up a large army to
fight the US-backed Contras and US economic
embargoes devastated the Nicaraguan economy.
Only the limited Soviet and European assistance
enabled the Sandinistas to survive. But Moscow’s
own economic troubles led to a cut in aid, and the
Soviet–US rapprochement forced Daniel Ortega
and the Sandinista leadership to modify their poli-
cies and invite a more genuine popular mandate
through free elections. At the same time, despite
Reagan’s strong support, the Contras were being
denied essential war supplies by the US Congress’s
refusal to supply the funds.
These conditions provided an opportunity for
the long-drawn-out peace negotiations sponsored
by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela,
whose presidents met on the island of Contadora
in the early 1980s, and then by Costa Rica’s
president. Arias Sánchez’s peace plan was signed
by the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in August
1987 and earned Arias Sánchez the Nobel Peace
Prize. It called for regional ceasefires in all the
guerrilla wars, democratic reforms and the ending
of foreign support for the rebels. It marked an
attempt by the Central American leaders to solve
their own problems without outside interfer-
ence. In Washington, the Reagan administration
greeted the peace plan with scepticism and suspi-
cion. It was difficult to believe that the Sandinista
leadership had any other motive but to persuade
the US Congress that the US administration’s
support for the Contras was an obstacle to peace;