The British government and Ian Smith might
have been able to reach a fudged agreement even
after UDI, which was denied British and inter-
national recognition. Negotiations were resumed
on the basis of ‘five principles’: unimpeded
progress to majority rule; guarantees against ret-
rogressive amendments to the constitution;
immediate improvement in the political status of
the African population; progress towards ending
racial discrimination; British satisfaction that pro-
posals for independence agreed upon by Britain
and the white settlers were acceptable to the
people of Rhodesia as a whole. But how many
years would have to elapse before the black
Africans gained majority rule? Smith declared in
1968 after meeting Wilson, ‘There will be no
majority rule in my lifetime – or in my children’s.’
That clearly was totally unacceptable to black
nationalist leaders. In 1969, Smith’s Rhodesian
parliament imposed a constitution that allowed
greater African participation and promised even-
tual ‘parity’, but ‘eventual’ in the light of Smith’s
timescale was a prospect beyond the horizon.
Smith simply condemned black nationalists as
communists and criminals, many of whom had
been safely detained. He argued that to allow
black majority rule would be a catastrophe for the
country, as it had already turned out to be in the
Congo and Uganda. Smith’s Rhodesia at this
time, he claimed, was a country of law and order,
of economic development despite sanctions,
thanks to the help of South Africa and Portugal.
The black Africans, too, would benefit more from
progress under white rule than from chaos under
black.
In 1971 Smith’s tenacity appeared to have paid
off. The Conservative government now in power
made a new attempt to reach a settlement with
him. After lengthy negotiations, the five principles
- somewhat watered down – became the basis of
an agreement between the rebellious Rhodesian
government and Britain. On the crucial issue of
majority rule, the timescale was to be left to the
white Rhodesians. There were objections to this
from Nkomo, Sithole and other nationalist
Africans who were still being detained. London
and Salisbury nevertheless proceeded to test black
opinion. In 1972 a British commission was sent
out. Their findings shattered illusions in both
Britain and Rhodesia. The commission unequivo-
cally concluded that the ‘people of Rhodesia as a
whole’ rejected the proposed settlement.
The two outlawed African nationalist parties
ZANU and ZAPU were faced with liberating black
Rhodesia by force, since the British government
seemed powerless. With a few hundred guerrillas
from bases in Mozambique and Zambia the task
looked hopeless. ZAPU looked to Moscow, and
ZANU guerrillas received their training and arms
in Algeria, Ghana, China and Czechoslovakia –
assistance that enabled Smith to denounce them as
communists. The black peasants in the north-east
of the country became victims of the brutal warfare
between the guerrillas and the security forces. Not
until the mid-1970s did the guerrillas make any
progress. And by 1974, Ian Smith was more ready
for compromise with the African leadership inside
and outside Rhodesia than he had been in the
1960s. The coup in Lisbon that year had under-
mined Portuguese determination to remain in
Mozambique; South Africa began to be anxious
to dissociate itself from Rhodesia, whose actions
had been condemned by the United Nations.
Sanctions too were taking their toll. So Smith
negotiated with Kaunda of Zambia and released
the black leadership, including Nkomo, Sithole
and Mugabe. But new negotiations failed. Mugabe
joined the guerrillas.
Sanctions and the settlers’ fears for the future
were now sapping settler morale. ZAPU and
ZANU increased the pressure by temporarily
burying their differences and forming the
Patriotic Front. Though the Rhodesian forces
could still inflict terrible damage on the guerrillas
and pursued them to their bases, resistance could
not be extinguished. Smith again tried to reach a
settlement by negotiation with the black nation-
alists. He was prepared to make major conces-
sions. In March 1978, a power-sharing ‘internal
agreement’ was actually reached between Ian
Smith and two black nationalist leaders, Bishop
Muzorewa and Sithole. There would be a black
prime minister and a black parliamentary major-
ity, with the white minority retaining a veto. Ten
years earlier this solution might have been suffi-
cient. Now it was too late. The Patriotic Front of
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