Gladio. It was originally set up early in the Cold
War as a secret military group to move into action
to counter a communist takeover of Italy. Its
functioning was known to successive Italian prime
ministers, including Giulio Andreotti, and revela-
tions by the judiciary in 1990 caused the ruling
political elite considerable embarrassment. It
seems to have become an extreme-right terrorist
organisation which attempted to incite anti-left
reactions. It was rumoured that Gladio was
responsible for a number of bombings in the
1970s and 1980s, including the explosion at
Bologna railway station. The theory was that
Gladio intended thereby to undermine the left,
whose terrorists were blamed for the outrages. If
so, Gladio was as much out of control as the Red
Brigades. What is clear is that Gladio belonged to
the unacceptable side of Italian politics. Yet it was
a healthy sign that there were other politicians,
civil servants and men with responsibilities in the
regions who were willing to bring corruption to
light. The mass trials of Mafiosi in Palermo in the
mid-1980s attested to their courage and deter-
mination. The fight against corruption had not
been won, but at least it was being waged.
With a period of political stability, reinforced by
the financial reforms of Bettino Craxi, the first
Socialist to become prime minister, which he
achieved in 1983 with majority Christian Demo-
crat backing, the Italian economy was nursed
back to better health. Inflation fell to an acceptable
5 per cent and unemployment fell too. But the
fundamental problems of Italy remained. The
north–south gap was increasing; northern industry
was geared to, and competitive within, Western
Europe; the regions south of Rome, despite thirty
years of development aid, remained backward and
uncompetitive, with a few remarkable exceptions.
The Abruzzo region, west of Rome, with a popu-
lation of 1.2 million, was no longer tied to poor
farming, but had developed modern industry
and tourism. Was that a harbinger of things to
come? There was little sign of this in Calabria,
Sicily or Sardinia. Twenty million Italians lived in
the south in the early 1990s; one in five was unem-
ployed. Thirty-six million Italians lived in the
northern half, where about one in fourteen was
unemployed and standards of living were almost
twice as high. As Western Europe integrated in
the 1990s, the south could be left increasingly
behind. If Italian government remained unstable –
and the auguries were not good – the mismanage-
ment of public resources, the growth of the huge
public debt and the inefficiency of an army of
bureaucrats would carry on unimpeded, and inter-
est groups would continue to be paid off from state
funds. It was a considerable burden, mainly carried
by the efficient, large-scale private industry of the
north. Without political reform, all these problems
would intensify.
Craxi managed to remain in office until August
1987, just short of an unprecedented four years.
In the election held that month he slightly
increased his percentage of the vote at the expense
of the Christian Democrats, who nonetheless
gained twice as many votes as the Socialists. The
alliance of the Socialists and Christian Democrats
under the premiership of Craxi had been one of
1
CONTEMPORARY ITALY 845
Chamber of Deputies elections, 1972–87
1972 1976 1979 1983 1987
% Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats
Communists (PCI) 27.2 179 34.4 227 30.4 201 29.9 198 26.6 177
Socialists (PSI) 9.6 61 9.7 57 9.8 62 11.4 73 14.3 94
Democratic Socialists (PSDI) 5.1 29 3.4 15 3.8 20 4.1 23 3.0 17
Christian Democrats (DC) 38.7 266 38.8 263 38.3 262 32.9 225 34.3 234
Liberal Party (PLI) 3.9 20 1.3 5 1.9 9 2.9 16 2.1 11
Republican Party (PRI) 2.9 15 3.1 14 3.0 16 5.1 29 3.7 21
Neo-Fascists (MSI) 8.7 56 6.1 35 5.3 30 6.8 49 5.9 35
Others 3.8 0 3.2 10 7.5 24 6.9 18 10.1 41
