both sides.Cooperation between Palestinians and
Israelis besides banishing death and destruction
promises great benefits for both peoples. Can the
bridge that leads to peace be constructed? It can
certainly not be done without outside help. There
was some progress, in May 2000 Israel withdrew
from the Lebanon though this greatly encouraged
Palestinian terrorists who saw it as a victory.
Arafat and Barak with their advisers were
brought together by Clinton at Camp David. The
Camp David blueprint in July 2000 that followed,
to be sure, did not offer a final peace deal and
would have left thorny problems outstanding but
it was a historic advance that proved the courage
and political will of Israeli’s prime minister Ehud
Barak. The Camp David secret negotiations had
brought the two sides closer but with character-
istic misjudgement Arafat held out on the eve of
the Israeli elections and so the window of oppor-
tunity closed. Instead of persevering with the
course of peace soon after he returned, he
believed that one more blow and shock would
secure more concessions from Israel on the issues
that had broken up negotiations in Camp David
- sovereignty over Haram-al-Sharif (the Muslim
Holy sites), Temple Mount its Jewish name, over
the legal right of return of Palestinian refugees
now increased to 3.5 million of whom over a
million were herded still in camps, and over a ter-
ritorial map of the new state that would be viable
and removed most of the more than 100 Jewish
settlements.
The US provides most aid and support for Israel
and could exert most pressure. Previous efforts to
mediate a peace had failed. The Arab world
accused the West of double standards ignoring
some UN resolutions and demanding enforce-
ment of others. Against Iraq, President George
W. Bush, the son of the president of the first Gulf
War, and Tony Blair later justified war in 2003
because Saddam Hussein did not fulfil the reso-
lutions of the Security Council. But what about
Israel which had also failed to carry out Security
Council Resolution 242 (1967). This had called
for a ‘just and lasting peace’, for the Israeli forces
to withdraw from territories occupied in the Six-
Day War, and for a ‘just settlement of the refugee
problem’. Fourteen other resolutions followed on
issues as diverse as Israel’s settlement policy, a
‘flagrant violation’, and the abuse of the human
rights of the Palestine people. Was this not indeed
an example of double standards? This argument
is persuasively presented and has moral force but
from a strictly legal point of view deserves close
scrutiny.
In the first place Resolution 242 was rejected
by the Arab nations who refused to accept the
existence of Israel within any borders and not
until 1993 did the PLO and Israel agree to nego-
tiate to implement the resolution. There is also a
crucial difference between the dozen resolutions
concerning Iraq passed after the first Gulf War
under the UN Charter’s Chapter Seven and the
Resolution on Israel and the Palestinians. On the
Iraqi resolutions the Security Council is empow-
ered under Chapter Seven to take all actions
including war to enforce its will.
The resolutions on the Israel–Palestine conflict
were passed under Chapter Six where the UN acts
as a mediator and makes recommendations that
are not binding on the countries in dispute
however strongly worded. From the point of view
purely of international law the distinction is
crucial.
The renewal of violence undermined Barak
who was obliged to counter with the strong arm
of the Israeli army ranged against stone-throwing
Palenstinian youths. The numbers of Palestinians
killed and wounded exceeded those of the Israelis
and inflamed passions. The casualty was the peace
process and Barak’s electoral chances. Barak was
defeated by Israeli’s ‘strongman’ Ariel Sharon in
- The future looked bleak.
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